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Thesis Abstract
Many have thought that it is impossible to rationally persuade a skeptic that we have
knowledge of the external world. My dissertation aims to show that this can be done.
In chapter one I consider a common reason for complacency about skepticism. Many
contemporary philosophers reject the skeptic's conclusion on the grounds that mere
philosophical argument can't rationally undermine common sense. I consider the
standard arguments for this view and find them wanting. I then argue in a positive vein
that philosophy can overturn common sense, on the assumption (shared by my
opponents) that science can overturn common sense. That the skeptic can't simply be
ignored makes the task of convincing the skeptic all the more urgent.
In the first half of chapter two I aim to convince the external world skeptic that her
position is irrational. Whoever accepts the argument for external world skepticism is, I
claim, thereby committed to accepting skepticism about the past, which commits them to
accepting a complex argument for skepticism about complex reasoning. But if one
accepts this argument, one's position is self-undermining in the following sense: one
believes a proposition P while at the same time believing that one should not believe P.
This combination of beliefs is not rational. But it is forced on anyone who accepts the
argument for external world skepticism, making it irrational to accept that argument.
I concluded in the first half of chapter two that one shouldn't believe skepticism, but this
leaves open the possibility that one should suspend judgment on skepticism. Next I argue
that this position is also irrational. However, this still doesn't quite establish that we
should believe that skepticism is false, for we need to rule out the possibility that we are
caught in an epistemic dilemma: that all attitudes one could take toward skepticism
would be irrational. I go on to argue that epistemic dilemmas are not possible. With this
claim in place, it follows that we ought to believe that skepticism is false. So it is
possible to reason one's way out of skepticism.
Thesis Supervisor: Roger White
Title: Associate Professor of Philosophy
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Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense
0. Introduction
Many contemporary philosophers have a rather limited view of what our
discipline could hope to achieve. They think that philosophical arguments could not
rationally overturn our pre-theoretical common sense convictions. Here, for example, is
Kit Fine:
"In this age of post-Moorean modesty, many of us are inclined to doubt that
philosophy is in possession of arguments that might genuinely serve to undermine
what we ordinarily believe."'
And David Lewis:
"One comes to philosophy already endowed with a stock of opinions. It is not the
business of philosophy either to undermine or justify these preexisting opinions,
but only to try to discover ways of expanding them into an orderly system." 2
Other advocates of positions of this kind include Lycan (2001), Kelly (2005), and
Kelly (2008). On the other hand, some contemporary analytic philosophers take the
opposing view. They present and endorse philosophical arguments against various
claims of common sense. For example, Unger (1975) argues that no one knows anything
at all. Van Inwagen (1990), Dorr (2002), and others argue that macroscopic objects like
tables and chairs do not exist.
Finally, I'll include some remarks on this topic by Kant and Hegel:
"To appeal to ordinary common sense.. .is one of the subtle discoveries of recent
times, whereby the dullest windbag can confidently take on the most profound
thinker and hold his own with him."3
"Since the man of common sense makes his appeal to feeling, to an oracle within
his breast, he is finished and done with anyone who does not agree; he has only to
explain that he has nothing more to say to anyone who does not find and feel the
same in himself. In other words, he tramples underfoot the roots of humanity." 4
As for myself, I wouldn't go so far as to say that Lewis, Fine, and company are
dull windbags. And I am not yet convinced that they have trampled underfoot the roots
of humanity. However, my view is in the spirit of these remarks. For I believe, contra
Lewis, Fine, etc., that philosophy can overturn common sense. It is the aim of this
chapter to defend that position.
'Fine (2001, 2)
2 Lewis (1973, 88)
3 Kant (2008, 9)
4 Hegel (1977, 43)
The chapter has two parts. In part one, I undermine some of the main reasons
philosophers have given for thinking that philosophical reflection can't overturn common
sense. First I consider the Moorean idea that common sense propositions are more
plausible than philosophical claims. Then I turn to the view, defended in Kelly 2005 and
also implicit in Goodman 1983, that one should retain belief in judgments about
particular cases at the expense of general philosophical principles that conflict with them.
Finally I consider a version of reflective equilibrium, defended in Harman 2003, in which
conservatism plays an important role.
In part two, I present and endorse a positive argument for the claim that
philosophy can overturn common sense. My opponents and I agree that science can
overturn common sense. But, I claim, every scientific argument relies on assumptions
that are highly theoretical, even philosophical. If a scientific argument against a common
sense proposition is to succeed, then its philosophical assumptions must be more worthy
of belief than the common sense proposition under attack. But this means that there
could be a philosophical argument against common sense, each of whose premises is just
as powerful, epistemically, as the scientist's philosophical assumptions. If the scientific
argument can succeed, then so, too, can the purely philosophical argument, and so
philosophy is capable of overturning common sense.
Part two does not presuppose any of the material from part one; those wishing to
skip directly to it may begin with section 5.
Before moving on to the details of these arguments, I would like to say why I
think this debate is so important. If my opponents are right, then I think the value and
interest of philosophy are significantly diminished. Most people-philosophers and non-
philosophers alike-care deeply about the truth of common sense propositions. It matters
greatly to us whether we know anything about the external world; whether macroscopic
objects like tables and chairs exist5 ; which actions, if any, are morally right and which are
morally wrong; etc. Almost everything we think, say, and do presupposes some
proposition of common sense (or its negation). If the business of philosophy is, at least in
part, to inquire into the truth of these propositions-with the real possibility left open that
we may find good reasons for rejecting them-then philosophy is highly relevant to
almost every aspect of our daily lives.
If, on the other hand, philosophers proceed by simply taking for granted a large
collection of common sense beliefs, and aim merely to "discover ways of expanding them
into an orderly system," 6 then I think it is much less obvious whether anyone should care
about what happens in philosophy. It's hard to see how this activity could yield results
that directly impact what we care about most.
Thus, for those of us who have chosen to devote our lives to philosophy, I think
the question of whether philosophy can overturn common sense is a very pressing one
indeed. So I am very pleased to say that I think the answer to this question is yes. It is
5 Some philosophers who deny that tables, chairs, etc. exist may not in fact be denying any common sense
propositions. These philosophers typically hold that there do really exist particles arranged table-wise, and
sometimes it is claimed that what we ordinarily mean when we say or presuppose that tables exist is no
more than that there are particles arranged table-wise. Since these philosophers don't take themselves to be
denying what we ordinarily mean by "tables exist," such philosophers may not count as denying common
sense propositions.
6 Lewis (1973, 88)
my aim in this chapter to present some considerations that, I hope, will move you to share
this view.
1. Introduction to Part One
In this first half of the chapter I will consider some of the most common
motivations for my opponents' view that philosophy cannot overturn common sense.
Each motivation relies crucially on some principle of philosophical methodology. I will
consider the following three methodological principles: (1) common sense propositions
enjoy greater plausibility than philosophical claims, and thus should be given priority
when they conflict (defended most famously by Moore 1962); (2) judgments about
particular cases should be given priority over judgments about general principles
(defended in Kelly 2005 as a kind of Mooreanism and also in Goodman 1983 as an aspect
of reflective equilibrium); (3) conservatism-minimizing change-is an important aspect
of rational belief revision (defended in Harman 2003 as a version of reflective
equilibrium and also suggested by certain remarks in Lewis 1996).
In each case, I will argue either that the methodological principle in question is
false, or that it fails to provide a genuinely independent motivation for the idea that
philosophy can't overturn common sense.
Throughout the discussion, I will focus (as do the defenders of these principles)
on the case of external world skepticism. The skeptic presents us with a valid argument
with plausible philosophical premises for the conclusion that no one knows anything
about the external world. For example, the skeptic may argue that all we have to go on in
assessing propositions about the external world is the evidence of our senses, i.e.
propositions about how things appear to us. But, continues the skeptic, this evidence is
neutral between the hypothesis that the external world really is as it seems and the
hypothesis that one is a brain in a vat being deceived by a mad scientist. So, concludes
the skeptic, no one knows whether they really have hands, whether there is a table before
them, etc.
By presenting her argument, the skeptic has shown us that there is a contradiction
between some plausible epistemological principles and our ordinary common sense
beliefs about what we know. How should we revise our beliefs in light of this? Should
we accept the skeptic's premises and the radical conclusion that follows from them? Or
should we hold on to our pre-theoretic belief that we know many things, and reject one of
the skeptic's premises? Each of the three methodological principles I will discuss yields
the verdict (according to its defenders) that we should hold on to our common sense
beliefs about the extent of our knowledge, and give up one of the skeptic's premises. But
I will argue that these principles do not succeed in motivating this view.
2. Moore's Plausibility Principle
We begin, of course, with G. E. Moore. I'll follow Lycan 2001 in characterizing
Moore's view roughly as follows: A common sense proposition is more plausible than
any premise in a philosophical argument against it. So, if forced to choose between
common sense and a philosophical premise, one should retain belief in common sense
and give up the philosophical premise. Call this Moore's Plausibility Principle.
In assessing this view, I think we should first ask what is meant by "plausible."
On one reading, A is more plausible than B just in case A seems pre-theoretically prima
facie more worthy of belief than B. If this is what is meant by "plausible," then I am
willing to grant that ordinary common sense may indeed be more plausible than complex
abstract philosophical principles.
The trouble is that it is simply not the case that, when conflicts arise, we should
always retain belief in whichever proposition seems pre-theoretically prima facie more
worthy of belief. Sometimes one discovers by reflection that one's pre-theoretical
judgments of comparative worthiness of belief were the reverse of what they should have
been. For example, consider the following two propositions: (A) There are more
positive integers than there are positive even integers. (B) Two sets X and Y have the
same cardinality just in case there is a one-to-one mapping from the elements of X to the
elements of Y and there is a one-to-one mapping from the elements of Y to the elements
of X. Pre-theoretically, A seems more worthy of belief than B. It just seems obvious that
there are more positive integers than positive even integers, and B is a complicated
principle that requires some thought before endorsing. So if plausibility is interpreted as
suggested above, Moore's Plausibility Principle says that one should retain belief in A
and reject B. However, this is exactly the opposite of what should be done. Reflection
should result in a reversal of one's initial judgment of the comparative worthiness of
belief of these two propositions.
For all that has been said so far, the skeptical case could be just like this one. Pre-
theoretically, it may seem obvious that one knows that one has hands, and the premises of
the skeptical argument may seem to be complicated claims that require thought before
endorsing. However, after reflecting on the skeptical premises, they come to seem more
and more plausible until it becomes clear that they are undeniable, and the claim to
knowledge must be rejected. So, although the skeptic may agree with Moore about the
pre-theoretical, prima facie judgments, neither the skeptic nor Moore should accept the
principle that these initial judgments determine which of the two propositions it is
rational to give up, since reflection can sometimes reveal that one's initial judgments
were the reverse of what they should have been.8
This discussion may suggest an alternative reading of the Plausibility Principle.
On the first reading, which of two conflicting propositions you should give up depends
on your pre-theoretic judgments about them. On the second version of the principle,
which of the two propositions you should give up is not determined by your initial
judgments; rather, it is determined by your judgments upon careful reflection. According
to this version of the principle, one should give up whichever of the two propositions
seems least worthy of belief upon careful reflection.
However, this version of the principle does not yield the result the Moorean
desires. It makes the normative facts about what one should believe dependent on the
contingent psychological facts about what happens to seem most worthy of belief upon
7 This point is also made by Conee 2001 and echoed by Kelly 2005.
8 The Monty Hall problem may provide another example of a case in which one's initial judgments of the
comparative worthiness of belief are the reverse of what they should be. Brad Skow reports (personal
communication) that he was initially completely convinced that there is no benefit to switching doors. In
general, psychology experiments like the Wason card selection task and the experiments discussed in the
heuristics and biases literature (see for example Kahneman, Tversky, and Slovic 1982) provide another
source of counterexamples to Moore's Plausibility Principle.
reflection. As a matter of psychological fact, upon careful reflection, each premise of the
skeptical argument seems to the external world skeptic to be more worthy of belief than
the common sense view that she has knowledge of the external world. So, according to
this version of the plausibility principle, she should give up the common sense belief on
the basis of the philosophical argument for skepticism. If so, then philosophical
argument can undermine common sense, which is exactly what the Moorean seeks to
deny.
We may consider a third, more normative understanding of what plausibility
amounts to: A is more plausible than B just in case as a matter of fact A is more worthy
of belief than B. This does not seem to help much; after all, the skeptic thinks that her
premises are more worthy of belief than the common sense claim to knowledge, and so
the skeptic will think that this version of the plausibility principle vindicates her position.
The Moorean may try to tack on the claim that the skeptic is wrong about this:
that, as a matter of fact, it is the common sense claim that is most worthy of belief.
Simply to insist that this is the case, however, does not provide us with an independent
motivation for the Moorean view. To say that common sense propositions are more
worthy of belief than philosophical claims just is to say that, in cases of conflict, we
should retain belief in common sense propositions at the expense of philosophical claims,
which is just to say that philosophy can't overturn common sense. What we have here is
a restatement of Moore's view, not an independent motivation for it.
I conclude, then, that each version of the plausibility principle is either false, or
fails to provide a genuinely independent motivation for the view that philosophy can't
overturn common sense.
3. General Principles vs. Particular Case Judgments
In his 2005 paper "Moorean Facts and Belief Revision or Can the Skeptic Win?",
Tom Kelly draws the same conclusion that I did in the previous section: Moore's
plausiblility principle does not successfully make the case that philosophical
argumentation can't overturn common sense propositions like our ordinary claims to
knowledge. However, Kelly then goes on to provide an alternative interpretation of
Moore that he thinks does succeed in showing this. I think Kelly's view is equally
unsuccessful.
Kelly begins by distinguishing two different principles of philosophical
methodology: particularism and methodism.9 The particularist and the methodist both
begin with some initial judgments about particular cases, and some initial judgments
about general principles. The difference between them manifests itself when a
contradiction is discovered between one of the initial case judgments and one of the
general principle judgments. In the face of such a contradiction, the particularist will
retain belief in the case judgment at the expense of the general principle. The methodist
9 Kelly's terminology is borrowed from Chisholm's 1973 book The Problem of the Criterion. Chisholm
used the terms slightly differently, to mark the distinction between the epistemologist who builds his theory
of knowledge around his initial views about the extent of our knowledge (the particularist) and the
epistemologist who builds his theory of knowledge around his initial views about the criteria for knowledge
(the methodist).
will do exactly the opposite, retaining belief in the general principle at the expense of the
particular case judgment.
Kelly's sympathies lie with the particularist. Moreover, he thinks that most
philosophers are committed to particularism by the very common practice of giving up a
general principle in light of a single counterexample. Consider, for example, Gettier's
argument, accepted by almost all epistemologists, against the theory that knowledge is
justified true belief. A methodist could not accept this argument. The fact that almost all
philosophers do accept it reveals, according to Kelly, that we are implicitly committed to
a particularistic, rather than methodistic, philosophical methodology. From this
commitment, claims Kelly, we can derive a commitment to the Moorean response to the
skeptic.
Kelly first notes that the skeptical argument relies crucially on a general principle
about knowledge or evidence. Moreover, he says, anyone who accepts the skeptical
argument will have to give up a number of judgments about cases, like the judgment that
I know that I have hands, that I know there is a table before me, etc. When we are
confronted with the skeptic's argument, then, we are forced to choose between a general
principle and some judgments about cases. The choice for the particularist is clear: we
must retain belief in our judgments about cases at the expense of the skeptic's general
principle. If so, then the skeptical argument cannot overturn our common sense beliefs
about the extent of our knowledge. 10
The only way out of this conclusion, according to Kelly, is to adopt methodism
instead of particularism as a principle of philosophical methodology. However, this
option is highly undesirable, since a methodist could never give up a general principle in
the face of a counterexample.
10 Nelson Goodman, in his discussion of the philosophical methodology that he called "reflective
equilibrium" in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast makes an argument against the inductive skeptic that is
essentially the same as Kelly's argument against the external world skeptic. According to Goodman, we
discover what a term means by finding a general principle about its meaning according to which the cases
to which the term is actually applied just are the cases to which the term is properly applied. This is how
we determine what "tree" means: we try to find a general principle that captures what is in common
between all the objects to which we apply the term "tree." Likewise, says Goodman, if you want to figure
out what it is for something to be a valid induction, then look for whatever it is that is in common between
all of the arguments to which we actually apply the term "valid induction." Clearly, if this is our procedure
for determining what a valid induction is, we will never find out that there are no valid inductions, and so
the inductive skeptic is wrong: there is no way that we could reach his conclusion by applying the proper
methodology. This methodology may not sound very much like reflective equilibrium, since reflective
equilibrium is supposed to be a bi-directional process of adjusting both the case judgments and the general
principles to bring them into equilibrium with each other. The process I described sounds instead like a
one-directional process in which the case judgments are held constant and the general principles are molded
to fit them. But, whatever is meant by "reflective equilibrium" these days, Goodman does not seem to
think that it would ever be rational to give up many case judgments because they conflict with a general
principle. He does think that general principles can influence our case judgments in the following way:
once we have found a general principle that systematizes our initial case judgments, we can use that general
principle to determine which judgments we should have about cases about which we were initially unsure.
But nowhere does Goodman say that we might revise a case judgment about which we were initially sure
because it conflicts with a general principle. Indeed, the assumption that this should not happen is required
for his argument against the inductive skeptic. Thus, I interpret Goodman as advancing an anti-skeptical
argument which relies on particularism, in Kelly's sense.
I think Kelly has presented us with a false dilemma. I agree that methodism is
undesirable, and I agree that particularism would commit us to the Moorean response to
the skeptic. However, we are not forced to choose between just these two theories of
philosophical methodology. Both the methodist and the particularist share a problematic
presupposition: that when one discovers a contraction between two beliefs, the mere fact
that one is a case judgment and the other a general principle is sufficient to determine
which one should be given up. This presupposition should be rejected. Sometimes we
should give up the general principle; sometimes we should give up the case judgment;
what we should give up depends on further details, and cannot simply be read off the
form of the beliefs alone.
Counterexamples like Gettier's show us that it can sometimes be rational to give
up a general principle that conflicts with a case judgment, but it doesn't show that we
should always give up the general principle in a case of conflict. I will now present two
cases in which one should give up a case judgment that conflicts with a general principle.
If I am right about these cases, then particularism is false, and Kelly's argument for
Mooreanism does not go through.
My first example is taken from the philosophy of probability; I include it mainly
for breadth. My second example is a case from epistemology; I think it's strongly
parallel to the skepticism case, and thus is particularly instructive in this context.
First, consider someone who tends to commit the gambler's fallacy. If he sees a
fair coin land heads many times in a row, he judges that the coin is more likely to land
tails than heads on the next toss; if the coin lands tails many times in a row, he judges that
heads is more likely than tails on the next toss; etc. Suppose that this person then takes a
philosophy of probability class, and encounters the principle "Independent tosses of a fair
coin are equally likely to come up heads." This principle strikes him as highly plausible.
Then, however, it is pointed out to him that if he accepts this principle, he should no
longer judge that heads is more likely than tails after a long series of tails (and likewise
for the other gambler's fallacy judgments he is apt to make).
Now according to particularism, the only rational response for this person is to
regard the principle as false, since it conflicts with many of his case judgments. But this
is clearly wrong: it may well be that the rational response for him is to give up the case
judgments. After all, if this person reflects on the principle, he may come to see why it's
true, and come to realize that his previous case judgments were mistaken and confused.
In such a case we would want to say that the rational thing for this person to do is to
retain belief in the general principle, and let this principle guide his case judgments. But
this is exactly what particularism says he must not do.
I think there are many examples of this sort: cases in which many of one's initial
case judgments were based on confusion, which can be cleared up when one reflects on a
conflicting (but true) general principle. Many of the other examples from the heuristics
and biases literature could be used to make the same point.
My next example is taken from epistemology. Consider someone who has never
taken a philosophy class, and who has never taken the time to reflect on the epistemic
status of ordinary, day-to-day beliefs. Let's call this person Ordinary. Now imagine that
a philosopher goes and has a chat with Ordinary. They are sitting on a sofa in front of a
table, on which there lies a book, in plain view, in natural light, etc. Upon chatting with
Ordinary, the philosopher discovers that he believes many things, including the
following: he believes that there's a book on the table and he believes that the sun will
rise tomorrow. The philosopher stubs his toe on the leg of the table, and discovers that
Ordinary also believes that the philosopher is in pain. Moreover, the philosopher
discovers that Ordinary is psychologically certain of these things, and takes himself to be
justified in being certain of them. Having never heard of the fanciful skeptical
hypotheses familiar to philosophers, Ordinary takes himself to have definitively ruled out
all possibilities in which these propositions are false, and so takes himself to be fully
justified and rational in being certain that they are true.
Suppose, however, that the philosopher goes on to describe to Ordinary certain
skeptical scenarios, involving evil demons who trick people into believing that there are
books in front of them when there really aren't, counter inductive worlds in which on one
remarkable day the sun fails to rise, bread fails to nourish etc., and worlds containing
zombies who are behaviorally equivalent to humans but have no conscious experiences.
Upon realizing that such scenarios are possible, Ordinary realizes that many of his
previous judgments of the form "I am justified in being certain that P" conflict with the
principle "If there is a scenario in which not-P that one cannot definitively rule out, then
one is not justified in being certain that P."
How should Ordinary revise his beliefs upon discovering this contradiction? I
think most epistemologists would agree that he should retain the general principle and
give up the case judgments. Of course, most would also say that he should still think that
he knows these propositions, or at least that he's justified in believing them. But he
should no longer think that he's justified in being certain of them, since he no longer
takes himself to have ruled out all possible scenarios in which they are false.
This is another case in which a number of one's initial case judgments were
mistaken as a result of conceptual confusion which can be cleared up by reflection. In
this case, we might say that Ordinary was lead into these mistakes by a limited
imagination: he failed to realize that scenarios like the skeptical scenarios were possible;
they had simply never occurred to him. This failure to recognize the possibility of
scenarios of a certain sort lead him to misapply his own concept of justified certainty. So
this is a case in which Ordinary should, upon realizing this mistake, retain belief in the
general principle about certainty and let its proper application guide his case judgments.
These two counterexamples to particularism illustrate a general way in which it
goes wrong. Particularism does not allow for the possibility that one systematically
misapplies one's own concepts due to conceptual confusion.I1 But surely this is possible,
as these two cases illustrate. It is possible to systematically misapply one's concept of
comparative probability, and it is possible to systematically misapply one's concept of
justified certainty. The skeptic claims that, just as it is possible to systematically
misapply these concepts, it is possible to systematically misapply our concept of
knowledge. And this, contends the skeptic, is exactly what we have in fact done.
In comparing the skeptical case to the two cases just discussed, I think it is
especially helpful to focus on the certainty case. This is because the response to the
conflict in the certainty case that is widely agreed by epistemologists to be the rational
one is highly structurally analogous to what the skeptic takes to be the rational response
in the case of knowledge. In both cases, there is some general principle about the
" Strictly speaking, particularism does not allow for the possibility that one rationally believes that one has
systematically failed to misapply one's own concept.
conditions under which one stands in a certain kind of epistemic relation to a proposition.
In the one case, it is a principle about when one is justified in being certain of something;
in the other case, it is whatever principle about knowledge is employed in the skeptical
argument. In both cases, one initially judges, of many of the propositions that one
believes, that one does stand in that epistemic relation to them. In fact, it may well be
almost the same set of propositions in each case. Most epistemologists would
recommend revising one's belief, about each such proposition, that one is justified in
being certain of it. The skeptic recommends revising one's belief, about each such
proposition, that one knows it. The two cases of belief revision are, structurally, almost
exactly the same.
We have just seen that the certainty case blocks Kelly's anti-skeptical argument
by showing that the methodological principle he relies on-particularism-is not true. In
general, it is a consequence of the close structural similarity of the certainty case and the
knowledge case that it will be extremely hard for any general principle of philosophical
methodology to yield the right result about the certainty case-namely, that one should
give up one's initial case judgments-while also yielding the result that one should retain
one's initial case judgments about what one knows.
It's time to take stock. Kelly endorses the methodological claim that in cases of
conflict, one should give up a general principle when it conflicts with a case judgment. If
this is true, then, when confronted with a conflict between a general philosophical
principle and a common sense judgment about a particular case, one should give up the
philosophical principle and retain belief in the common sense judgment. However, I
have argued that Kelly's methodological principle fails because it does not allow for the
possibility that one has systematically misapplied one's concepts. I used two cases-the
gambler's fallacy case and the certainty case-to illustrate that systematic misapplication
of concepts is indeed possible.
4. Conservatism and Reflective Equilibrium
In this section I will discuss a version of reflective equilibrium that emphasizes
minimal change as an important aspect of rational belief revision-not just in philosophy,
but belief revision of any kind. I will focus on the version elaborated and defended by
Gil Harman, but note that Lewis 1996, Pryor 2000, and many others also take
conservatism to be an important part of proper philosophical methodology.
In the section entitled "Philosophical Skepticism" of his paper "Skepticism and
Foundations," Harman describes the basics of his version of reflective equilibrium and
argues that it has the result that we should retain belief in the common sense proposition
that we know we have hands and give up one of the skeptic's premises.
Harman begins by considering a person-let's call him Ordinary-who has the
usual beliefs about the external world, and about the extent of his knowledge of the
external world, and who also believes (implicitly, perhaps) the premises of the skeptical
argument. Suppose Ordinary then discovers the contradiction between his beliefs about
the extent of his knowledge and the skeptical premises that he accepts. How should
Ordinary revise his beliefs in order to avoid this inconsistency?
Harman's principle says that "the way to resolve such conflicts is by finding the
minimal adjustment in S's beliefs and methods that provides the most simple and
coherent upshot." Upon discovering a contradiction in one's beliefs, one must choose to
update to just one of the many possible complete systems of belief that resolve this
contradiction in some way. According to the Harman principle, you should adopt
whichever one of these complete systems of belief best balances minimal change,
coherence, and simplicity.
Now consider the particular case at hand, in which one has discovered a conflict
between the skeptic's premises and one's beliefs about the extent of one's knowledge.
Retaining the skeptical premises requires giving up a vast number of beliefs about the
external world, and about one's knowledge of it. This would involve a very large change
in one's system of belief. Giving up one of the skeptical premises, however, would
require only a very small change in comparison; all of one's beliefs about the external
world, and one's knowledge of it, would remain intact. Thus, Harman's principle of
belief revision, with its emphasis on minimal change, yields the result that one ought to
give up one of the skeptical premises.' 2 Once again, I'm happy to concede for the sake of
argument that the verdict generalizes: that whenever one finds a philosophical argument
against a common sense proposition, rejecting one of the premises would result in a more
minimal overall change than would accepting the argument; and so, Harman's view
yields the result that, in general, philosophy can't overturn common sense.
Lewis expresses the same general thought in the following quote from "Elusive
Knowledge:" "We are caught between the rock of fallibilism and the whirlpool of
skepticism. Both are mad! Yet fallibilism is the less intrusive madness. It demands less
frequent corrections of what we want to say. So, if forced to choose, I choose
fallibilism." I'll focus on Harman's version of the idea, though, since it's developed in
more detail.
I will argue that Harman's principle of rational belief revision is not a good one.
First, note that the counterexamples to particularism also constitute counterexamples to
Harman's principle. In these counterexamples, it is rational to revise a great many of
one's initial case judgments because they conflict with a single general principle.
Because there are so many case judgments that must be revised, rejecting the general
principle instead would have constituted a more minimal change. So, Harman's principle
shares the flaw identified earlier in Kelly's principle: it does not allow for the possibility
of systematic misapplication of one's concepts.
However, I want to develop and bring out another, perhaps deeper, problem with
Harman's principle of rational belief revision.
As noted above, while Harman takes his principle to correctly describe rational
revision of beliefs in philosophy, he does not think it is limited to beliefs in this area.
Indeed, Harman takes his principle to apply to all rational belief revision. I will present a
counterexample to Harman's view involving a case of evidence by testimony to bring out
the second general problem with Harman's principle. Ultimately, I will argue that
Harman's principle fails to be appropriately sensitive to the relations of epistemic
dependence that obtain between some beliefs.
1 In fact, Harman needs to make a few further assumptions in order to reach this conclusion. It must be
assumed that giving up the skeptical principle does not result in large losses in simplicity and coherence;
and, it must be assumed that the option of retaining the skeptical principle and the claims to knowledge,
and giving up the belief that they conflict, would not be acceptable.
I'll start by describing a case that does not itself constitute a counterexample to
Harman's principle, but which will help me set up the counterexample.
Case 1: Imagine that you have lived your entire life in a remote, isolated village, and
know nothing about the world beyond the village borders. One day you encounter a
visiting stranger, Alice, who tells you she's spent her life traveling around the world,
including a place called "Costa Rica," and proceeds to tell you about the beautiful birds
she saw there. Naturally, you believe what she tells you. Later, however, you meet up
with one of your best buddies-Bert. Bert has an uncanny knack for being able to tell
when people are lying. Time and again he's told you that someone was lying about
something, and independent investigation proved him right. This time, Bert tells you that
Alice was lying-in fact, she has never been to Costa Rica.
It is obvious that in this situation you should believe Bert. After all, Bert has an
excellent track record of detecting lying, and you only just met Alice. Now consider a
modified version of this case. Case 2 (below) is exactly like case 1, with the following
exception:
Case 2: Alice didn't just tell you a few things about Costa Rica. Rather, she has told you
many stories about her travels all around the world. You love listening to these stories,
and you spent most of your evenings listening to them. As a result, you have
accumulated a vast and detailed system of beliefs about the world beyond the village
border, all on the basis of Alice's testimony. It is only after this has been going on quite
a while that Bert tells you that Alice has been lying the whole time.
I think it's equally obvious that you should believe Bert in case 2 as well. After
all, as before, Bert has an incredible track record; and, the mere fact that Alice has told
you many things does not make any particular one of them more credible.
However, Harman's principle says otherwise. In case 2 (but not case 1) believing
Bert would require you to give up a vast number of other beliefs that you have-you
would have to give up all your beliefs about the nature of the world outside your village.
This constitutes quite a substantial change in your overall system of belief. Such a
substantial change would not be required if you were to believe instead that Bert just
happened to be wrong in this particular case. This would be quite a minimal change,
overall, since you could retain all the beliefs you formed on the basis of Alice's
testimony. So, Harman's principle says you should retain belief in everything that Alice
told you. But clearly this is not the rational response to hearing what Bert said. You
should believe Bert, even though this requires you to give up all of your beliefs about
what lies beyond the village border.
Before explaining what general problem I think this illustrates with Harman's
view, I will consider and respond to a possible response from a defender of Harman's
principle of belief revision.
Harman might respond that in fact, his principle does not have the consequence
that I claim it has. I claimed that Harman's principle has the consequence that you
should retain believe in what Alice told you, since this makes for a more minimal change.
But Harman's principle says that minimal change is just one criterion, to be balanced
with the other criteria of simplicity and coherence. While there doesn't seem to be any
difference in simplicity between the two belief systems, there may seem to be a
difference in coherence. It will be helpful to describe in more detail the two complete
belief systems you're choosing between. I've named them BERT and ALICE:
BERT: Bert is right that Alice was lying to me; after all, he's always been right in the
past. So, I cannot trust anything that Alice told me, and must give up all the beliefs I had
formed on the basis of her testimony.
ALICE: Alice has been telling me the truth the entire time. Although Bert is generally
right, he was wrong in this case.
Harman might claim that ALICE, while a more minimal change than BERT, is
less coherent than BERT. After all, on belief system ALICE, you believe that Bert is
generally reliable, but you also believe that he was wrong in this case, even though you
don't also believe that there is some particular feature of this case in virtue of which he
was likely to make a mistake. Surely this collection of beliefs doesn't hang together very
well, and could be seen as making for a slight incoherence in belief system ALICE.
I have several things to say in response. First, even if ALICE is slightly less
coherent than BERT, it remains that BERT involves a much more substantial change than
ALICE. Harman has not told us how much weight to give the various criteria of
coherence, minimal change, etc., but unless coherence is given much more weight than
minimal change, it looks like on balance, Harman's principle still favors ALICE over
BERT.
Setting this aside, though, I think this putative problem can easily be
circumvented. A slight modification of ALICE will get rid of the minor incoherence.
Consider ALICE*:
ALICE*: Alice has been telling me the truth the entire time. Although in general when
Bert tells me someone is lying, that person really is lying, I can see that Bert is jealous of
all the time I'm spending with Alice, and he told me she is lying only because he hopes it
will have the effect of my spending less time with her. I couldn't explain to someone in
words exactly what it is that makes me believe he's jealous, but I can just tell he is by the
way they interact.
ALICE* does not have any of the mild incoherence that might have been found in
ALICE; and, it is still a much more minimal change than BERT. So, even if Harman's
principle does not yield the result that the rational response to hearing what Bert had to
say is to revise your beliefs to the system ALICE, it does say that rather than revising
your system of beliefs to BERT, you should revise your system of beliefs to ALICE*,
since that would constitute a much more minimal change, and it is no less simple or
coherent.
So, for example, consider someone who, prior to hearing Bert's claim that Alice is
lying, did not suspect that Bert was jealous, and who has no good evidence that Bert is
jealous. However, this person is loath to make any very serious changes to his belief
system, and whenever he encounters evidence against many of his beliefs, he has a
tendency to come up with some way of explaining the evidence away, rather than coming
to terms with the real implications of the evidence (of course he would not describe
himself that way). So, when this person hears Bert's claim that Alice has been lying, he
immediately begins to suspect that there's something fishy going on, and eventually
convinces himself that Bert is jealous of Alice, etc.-in short, he comes to accept belief
system ALICE*. According to Harman's principle, this person is revising his beliefs
exactly as he should be. But this is clearly the wrong result. The rational response to
Bert's testimony is not to continue to believe Alice, but rather to give up belief in
everything Alice said.
Now that I've established that this case does indeed constitute a problem for
Harman's principle, I'll move on to the diagnosis: what deeper problem with Harman's
principle is illustrated by this counterexample?
The core of my diagnosis will be as follows. There is a relation of epistemic
dependence that holds between some beliefs (I will say more about epistemic dependence
in a moment). I claim that beliefs that depend epistemically on some other belief Q are
irrelevant to whether or not Q should be given up. That is, how many beliefs there are
that depend on Q, and what the contents of those beliefs are, is irrelevant to whether
belief in Q should be maintained. But whether Harman's principle recommends giving
up belief in Q is sometimes determined in part by beliefs that depend on Q. This is the
problem with Harman's principle that is brought out by the counterexample I gave.
In order to further explain and defend this diagnosis, I need to give some
explanation of the notion of epistemic dependence. There are several formal properties
of the dependence relation that can be noted at the outset. First, dependence is relative to
an agent; it may be that P depends on Q for one agent but not for another. Second, the
dependence relation is never symmetric. If P depends on Q, then Q does not depend on P
(relative to the same agent, of course).' 3
Now for a more substantive characterization of dependence. The intuitive idea is
that P depends on Q for an agent S when S's belief that P is based (at least in part) on S's
belief that Q, and when Q (perhaps in conjunction with other beliefs that S has) does
indeed justify P; P derives its justification (at least in part) from Q.
Relations of epistemic dependence are commonplace. My belief that the chicken
I just ate had not gone bad depends on my belief that I took the chicken meat out of the
freezer and into the fridge only a day or two ago (and not, say, several weeks ago). My
belief that the temperature is 84 degrees depends on my belief that my thermometer reads
"84." My belief that the butler did it depends on my belief that the butler's fingerprints
were found at the scene of the crime.
Moreover, your belief that there are beautiful birds in Costa Rica depends on your
belief that Alice is telling the truth. Harman's principle says that you should retain your
belief that Alice is telling the truth because giving it up would require you to give up your
belief that birds in Costa Rica are beautiful, and all other such beliefs. On Harman's
13 Some epistemologists (perhaps some coherentists) may disagree with me about this; they may think that
some cases of dependence are symmetric. That's ok for me, as long as the coherentist is willing to grant
that some cases of dependence are asymmetric, and, in particular, that my belief that birds in Costa Rica are
beautiful asymmetrically depends on my belief that Alice has been telling the truth. Instead of claiming
that beliefs that depend on Q are never relevant to whether Q should be given up, I would then re-state my
claim as this: beliefs that depend asymmetrically on Q are never relevant to whether Q should be given up.
The argument against Harman goes through just as well this way.
principle, part of what makes it the case that you are justified in holding on to your belief
that Alice is telling the truth is that you have many other beliefs that depend on it, and
which you would have to give up with it. But that is to make beliefs that depend on P
relevant to whether or not belief in P should be retained. In particular, it is to make
beliefs that depend on your belief that Alice is telling to truth relevant to whether you
should continue to believe that Alice is telling the truth. And it is my contention that
beliefs that depend on P are never relevant to whether belief in P should be retained.
Whether you have any beliefs that depend on P, and if so, what beliefs they are, is
irrelevant to whether or not it would be epistemically rational for you to retain belief in P.
The problem with Harman's principle is that it is not consistent with this fact.
Let's take stock. I have argued that there are at least two main problems for
Harman's principle of belief revision. The first is that, like Kelly's particularism, it does
not allow for the possibility of systematic misapplication of concepts. The second is that
it allows the number and nature of beliefs that depend on P to be relevant to whether
belief in P should be retained. Thus, Harman's principle is false, and so, like Moore's
plausibility principle and Kelly's particularism, it cannot be used to motivate the idea that
philosophy can't overturn common sense.
5. Introduction to Part Two: Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense
In this second part of the chapter I will provide a positive argument for the claim
that philosophy can overturn common sense. In its simplest form, the argument is as
follows:
(1) Science can overturn common sense.
(2) If science can overturn common sense, then so can philosophy.
(3) Therefore, philosophy can overturn common sense.
This argument is not original to me. Indeed, it is considered, and rejected, by
many of my opponents. My main contribution will come in the form of my particular
defense of premise (2), for it is this premise that is generally rejected by the advocates of
common sense. Premise (1) is widely accepted, and the argument is valid, so I will focus
primarily on defending premise (2) (though see section 7, reply to objection 5 for a
defense of premise (1)).
It will be helpful to begin by considering my opponents' argument against
premise (2). Here are some relevant quotes, starting with one from Bill Lycan:
"Common-sense beliefs can be corrected, even trashed entirely, by careful
empirical investigation and scientific theorizing.. .No purely philosophical
premise can ever (legitimately) have as strong a claim to our allegiance as can a
humble common-sense proposition such as Moore's autobiographical ones.
Science can correct common sense; metaphysics and philosophical "intuition" can
only throw spitballs." 4
Anil Gupta expresses a similar sentiment:
14 Lycan 2001
"Any theory that would wage war against common sense had better come loaded
with some powerful ammunition. Philosophy is incapable of providing such
ammunition. Empirical sciences are a better source."' 5
The idea here-which is also found in Kelly 2008-can be summarized as
follows: science, unlike philosophy, can appeal to empirical, observational evidence.
When science undermines common sense, it does so by appealing to direct observation.
When the philosopher attempts to undermine common sense, however, she can appeal
only to highly theoretical premises, which are less powerful, epistemically, than
observational evidence. So scientific arguments against common sense are more
powerful than philosophical argument against common sense.
There are many concerns one might have about this argument. First, it is
notoriously difficult to distinguish observational and theoretical claims. Second, even
supposing one can do so, it is not clear that observational claims really are epistemically
stronger than theoretical ones.
However, I want to set these worries aside, and focus on what I think is a deeper
flaw in this argument. I agree with my opponents that scientific arguments, unlike
philosophical arguments, appeal to observational claims. However, I will argue that
scientific arguments must also rely on highly theoretical assumptions that are just as far
removed from observation as the kinds of claims typically appealed to in philosophical
arguments against common sense. Indeed, many of these theoretical scientific
assumptions are straightforward examples of typical philosophical claims. An argument
is only as strong as its weakest premise. So if a scientific argument is to succeed in
undermining common sense, then each of its premises, individually, must be more
epistemically powerful than the common sense proposition it targets.16 Since, as I claim,
the scientific argument relies crucially on a philosophical assumption, this philosophical
assumption must be more powerful than the common sense proposition. But if a
philosophical claim can be more powerful than a common sense proposition, then there
could be an argument consisting entirely of philosophical claims, each of which is more
powerful than the common sense proposition whose negation they entail. If so, then
philosophy can overturn common sense.
The argument I just sketched appealed to the following claim:
Science Requires Philosophy (SRP): Scientific arguments against common
sense rely crucially on philosophical assumptions.' 7
15 Gupta (2006, 178)
16 A is more epistemically powerful than B just in case, if forced to choose between A and B, one should
retain belief in A and give up belief in B.
17 As stated, SRP is ambiguous in a certain way: it doesn't specify whether some, most, or all scientific
arguments against common sense rely on philosophical assumptions. In fact, for my argument to go
through, all that is strictly speaking required is that one successful scientific argument against common
sense relies on a philosophical assumption; for if so, then at least one philosophical assumption is more
powerful than a common sense proposition, which shows that there could be a successful purely
philosophical argument against common sense. However, as a matter of fact, I think that most, if not all,
scientific arguments rely on philosophical assumptions. I will return to this question of generality at the
end of the next section.
The next section will be devoted to defending this claim.
6. Defense of Science Requires Philosophy (SRP)
I will begin my case for SRP by considering what is perhaps the most widely
accepted example of a case in which science has succeeded in overturning common
sense: special relativity. Most philosophers-including many who think that philosophy
can't overturn common sense-believe that special relativity is true, and agree that
special relativity conflicts with common sense. So if I can show that the scientific
argument for special relativity relies crucially on a philosophical assumption, then this, in
combination with my arguments from the previous section, will suffice to show that
philosophy can overturn common sense.
We needn't get too far into the technical details, but some basic knowledge of the
case will be helpful. Consider a simultaneity proposition like this one: Joe's piano
recital and Sarah's baseball game were happening at the same time. Pre-theoretically, we
would think that a proposition like this one, if true, is objectively and absolutely true; its
truth is not relative to a particular person or thing. "Licorice ice cream is delicious" may
be true for Joe but not for Sarah, but the simultaneity proposition, we would normally
think, is true absolutely if true at all. However, according to special relativity (SR), this
is not the case. SR says that there are many different reference frames-each object has
its own-and the very same simultaneity proposition may be true in one reference frame
but not another. Moreover, there's no particular reference frame that has got it right.
Each reference frame has the same status; none is more legitimate than the others. So,
special relativity conflicts with the common sense idea that simultaneity claims are
absolute.
Now, there is an alternative scientific hypothesis-the so-called neo-Lorentzian
view-that is empirically equivalent to special relativity but which does not conflict with
the common sense idea that simultaneity is absolute. Special relativity and neo-
Lorentzianism agree on almost everything. In particular, they agree on all observational
propositions-there is no possible experiment that would decide between them. The
main difference is that according to neo-Lorentzianism, one of the reference frames is
privileged in the sense that it gets the simultaneity facts right. On this view, one
particular reference frame is objectively and absolutely correct. So the neo-Lorentzian
view vindicates the common sense idea that simultaneity is absolute.
Most scientists-and most philosophers-believe that special relativity, rather
than the neo-Lorentzian view, is true. They say that the neo-Lorentzian view is
unnecessarily complex. It posits an additional metaphysical fact-a fact about which
reference frame gets things absolutely correct-that doesn't make a difference to the
empirical predictions of the theory. Special relativity "gets the job done" with less
machinery. So if we follow Ockham in thinking that simpler hypotheses should be given
more credence than complex ones, we will give more credence to special relativity than
to the neo-Lorentzian view. This, in fact, is what most scientists and philosophers do,
and for this reason they give up the common sense idea that simultaneity is absolute.
With these facts on the table, we can now ask the crucial question: does the
argument from special relativity against the absoluteness of simultaneity rely crucially on
a philosophical assumption? I think that it does. In particular, it relies on the
philosophical assumption that simpler hypotheses should be preferred over complex ones.
Anyone who gives up the view that simultaneity is absolute on the basis of special
relativity must have a reason for preferring special relativity to the neo-Lorentzian view.
The reason standardly given is that special relativity is simpler. Without the further claim
that simpler theories should be preferred, we simply don't have any reason to give up the
common sense idea that simultaneity is absolute. So the defender of special relativity
must think that a philosophical assumption-the claim that simpler theories should be
preferred over complex ones-is more epistemically powerful than a common sense
proposition.
Here's another way to make the point. Suppose that this philosophical
assumption were not more powerful than the common sense claim. In that case, one
should reason as follows: well, the idea that simpler theories are preferable does have
some plausibility to it. But if this is true, then we have to prefer special relativity to the
neo-Lorentzian view, since it is simpler. But this would force us to give up the common
sense idea that simultaneity is absolute. This common sense claim is more powerful than
the philosophical assumption that simpler theories are preferable. So, I will retain belief
in the common sense claim, give up my preference for simpler theories, and then believe
what the empirical evidence forces me to believe, namely, that the neo-Lorentzian view is
true. Most philosophers, however, do not reason in this manner. Since they think we
should accept special relativity, I conclude that they must think that the philosophical
preference for simplicity is more powerful than the common sense notion that
simultaneity is absolute.
So, we see that the insistence by Kelly, Lycan, and Gupta that observational
evidence is more powerful than philosophical claims, and their pointing out that science,
unlike philosophy, appeals to observational evidence, is beside the point. No matter how
much observational evidence is appealed to in a scientific argument against common
sense, as long as the argument relies crucially on a philosophical assumption, then, if the
argument is to succeed, this philosophical assumption must be more powerful than the
targeted proposition of common sense.
The next section of this chapter will be devoted to presenting and replying to a
variety of ways in which one might object to the argument I've just given. But first,
before closing this section, I'll briefly address the question of how general this
phenomenon might be. That is, is the argument for special relativity unique among
scientific arguments in its reliance on philosophical assumptions? Or is the phenomenon
more widespread?
I think there is a general reason to suspect that the phenomenon is widespread.
Scientific arguments against common sense typically proceed by noting that a currently
accepted scientific hypothesis is in conflict with common sense. However, scientific
hypotheses are generally not logically entailed by the data that support them. Moreover,
it is usually only the full-blown hypothesis that conflicts with common sense, rather than
the data themselves. This is true in many other commonly cited examples of the
overturning of common sense by science: astronomical hypotheses according to which
the earth is round, rather than flat, and according to which the earth orbits the sun, rather
than vice versa; and the hypothesis that tables, chairs, and other objects are mostly empty
space, rather than solid.
Since it is only the full-blown hypothesis and not the empirical data that conflicts
with common sense, there will be an empirically equivalent competitor hypothesis that
vindicates common sense. If so, then a philosophical assumption will be required if the
non-common-sensical theory is preferred. Such an assumption will likely be an
epistemological principle about theory choice, such as the claim that one hypothesis
explains the data better and should for that reason be preferred; or that one hypothesis is
simpler, more internally coherent, or better unified with other accepted theories, and that
these constitute reasons for preferring it; etc. So, although this is not essential for my
argument, I suspect that the reliance of science on philosophy is not an isolated
phenomenon restricted to a few cases like special relativity, but is rather the norm.
Let's take stock. I have argued that the paradigm example of a successful
scientific argument against common sense-the argument for special relativity-relies
crucially on a philosophical assumption, namely the assumption that simpler hypotheses
should be preferred over complex ones. Anyone who accepts special relativity on the
basis of the scientific argument for it is committed to thinking that this philosophical
assumption is more epistemically powerful than the common sense idea that simultaneity
is absolute. If so, then there could be a successful argument against a common sense
proposition that relied only on philosophical assumptions. If each of its premises are at
least as powerful as the claim that simpler theories should be preferred, then a
philosophical argument against common sense will succeed.
One upshot of this result is that one can't dismiss arguments like the argument for
external world skepticism just on the grounds that its premises are purely philosophical.
Rather, one must carefully consider the status of each of its premises in comparison to the
common sense claim that we know we have hands-and, crucially, in comparison to the
status of the philosophical assumptions required by the scientific arguments that one
accepts.
It is not my purpose here to deliver a final verdict on the success of the skeptical
argument' , so I will not undertake an in-depth comparison here. However, I will note
that, on the face of it, things don't look at all bad for the skeptic. Take, for example, one
of key premises in one version of the argument for skepticism: the claim that propositions
about the way things appear to us-for example, the proposition that it appears as though
I have a hand-are evidentially neutral between the hypothesis that things really are the
way they appear (I really do have a hand) and the hypothesis that I am a brain in a vat
being fed misleading appearances as of a hand. This claim is extremely compelling.
How could the appearance of a hand be evidence for one of these hypotheses over the
other, when both predict that I would have exactly this appearance? Compare this claim,
now, with the claim that we ought to prefer simpler theories over complex ones. While
this claim is accepted by many philosophers, to me it seems if anything it is less
obviously correct than the skeptic's premise just mentioned. If this claim is powerful
enough to overturn a common sense proposition, then it seems to me that the skeptic's
claim is as well.
Of course, there is much more that could be said on this topic-for example, one
might try to argue in response that the common sense claim that simultaneity is absolute
was antecedently less powerful than the claim that I know I have hands, and so it may not
suffice for the skeptic's premises to be as powerful as the scientist's philosophical
18 I do so in Rinard (unpublished manuscript).
assumptions. My point here is just that once we have seen that, as in the case of special
relativity, philosophical assumptions can be more powerful than common sense, skeptical
arguments and other philosophical attacks on common sense can no longer be dismissed
out of hand. A careful and serious investigation into the epistemic status of their
premises needs to be undertaken, and, at the outset, it is not at all clear that these
premises won't in the end stand victorious.
7. Objections and Replies
Objection 1:
The argument just given presupposes that the scientific argument for special
relativity relies crucially on the philosophical assumption that simpler theories should be
preferred to complex ones. However (says the objector), not all arguments for special
relativity rely on this assumption. The following is a perfectly valid argument: (1)
[empirical scientific data]; (2) If [empirical scientific data], then special relativity is true;
therefore, (3) special relativity is true.
Reply:
Let's think more about the status of premise (2) in the objector's argument. We'll
assume that the person considering the argument is a scientist or philosopher aware of the
existence of the neo-Lorentzian view. What reason could such a person have for
believing (2)? After all, the empirical data are entailed by both special relativity and neo-
Lorentzianism. It seems to me that such a person must think that special relativity has
some other feature, that neo-Lorentzianism does not have, such that hypotheses with that
feature should be given greater credence. But, whatever the feature, the claim that
hypotheses with this feature should be given greater credence will be a philosophical,
epistemological claim. If one doesn't believe a philosophical claim of this kind, then one
would not believe (2), and the argument wouldn't go through. So I claim that any
argument for special relativity must rely at least implicitly on a philosophical assumption.
Objection 2:
I concede (says the objector) that the scientific argument for special relativity
relies on a philosophical assumption. However, we have more reason to believe the
philosophical assumptions that are typically appealed to in scientific arguments against
common sense than the philosophical assumptions that typically appear in philosophical
arguments against common sense. This is because science has such an impressive track
record. Every time we use a laptop or walk over a bridge, we are getting evidence that
scientists know what they are doing, and that we should believe whatever theories and
philosophical assumptions are endorsed by science. We have no similar reason for
believing the assumptions made by philosophers, since philosophy as a discipline does
not have a similar track-record.
Reply:
According to the objector, it is in virtue of science's long and impressive track-
record of success that we should believe the philosophical assumptions that appear in
scientific arguments like the argument for special relativity. If the objector is right, this
means that in the absence of such a track record, we would have no reason to believe
these assumptions. But I don't think this is right, and I don't think my opponents would
agree with this either.
Consider a hypothetical scenario in which human history went quite differently.
Let's suppose that the very first scientist to appear managed to acquire the empirical
evidence that actual scientists now take to constitute their reason to believe special
relativity. Let's suppose that after reflecting on this evidence, the first scientist
developed the theory of special relativity. She also developed and considered the neo-
Lorentzian view, but reasoned that special relativity should be preferred because it was
simpler and more elegant. Now, given that this scientist is working in a society that does
not have a long track-record of the success of science, according to the objection just
given, this scientist has no reason to believe her philosophical assumption that simpler
theories are to be preferred. However, I think the scientists and philosophers who believe
special relativity today would agree that this first scientist would be entirely justified in
assuming that simpler theories should be preferred, and giving up her common sense
beliefs on that basis. If so, then a long track-record is not required for science to overturn
common sense, and the objection fails.
Objection 3:
You (says the objector) have argued that anyone who gives up the common sense
idea that simultaneity is absolute must do so on the basis of an argument that relies
crucially on philosophical assumptions. But you assumed that the person in question was
a scientist or philosopher familiar with the neo-Lorentzian view. However, many lay
people have given up the absoluteness of simultaneity without having the faintest idea of
what neo-Lorentzianism is, or even what special relativity is, just on the basis of the
testimony of scientists or teachers. Surely they didn't have to rely on any assumptions
about the relative merit of simple and complex scientific theories, but it was rational
nonetheless for them to give up the common sense idea that simultaneity is absolute.
Reply:
First, note that my argument does not require that everyone who rationally gives
up the absoluteness of simultaneity must rely on philosophical assumptions. It is enough
that one could rationally do so on the basis of an argument that does rely on philosophical
assumptions, as that alone is sufficient to show that philosophical assumptions can be
more powerful than common sense.
However, as a matter of fact, I do think the layperson described by the objector is
relying, at least implicitly, on some philosophical assumptions, although they may be
quite different from the assumptions relied on by the scientist. For example, she is
relying on the assumption that testimony is a legitimate way to acquire justified beliefs.
This is an epistemological claim.
Objection 4:
The scientists' philosophical assumptions are more powerful than the
philosophers' because there is more agreement about them.
Reply:
As in my reply to objection 1, we can consider a hypothetical scenario in which
there is no established scientific community, nor even an established intellectual
community. According to the objector, a philosophical assumption is strong enough to
overturn common sense only when there is consensus about it. But I think even my
opponents would agree that a lone scientist, in ignorance of what anyone else thinks of
the idea that simpler theories are preferable, could, if in possession of the right empirical
evidence, rationally come to believe special relativity by relying in part on philosophical
claims. This shows that it is not in virtue of the consensus in the scientific community
that philosophical assumptions can be more powerful than common sense.
At this point, the objector may concede that consensus is not required for one to
be justified in the assumption that simpler theories should be preferred to complex ones.
However, the objector may then claim that the presence of significant disagreement
would suffice to undermine one's justification in this philosophical assumption.
Moreover, says the objector, since there is significant disagreement about the
philosophical assumptions that are employed in philosophical arguments against common
sense, this undermines any justification we might otherwise have had for accepting these
arguments. On this view, philosophy can't overturn common sense (even though science
can) because there is significant disagreement about the philosophical assumptions made
in philosophical arguments.
Once again, however, I think the objector is committed to some implausible
claims about certain hypothetical scenarios. Suppose that, when special relativity was
initially presented to the scientific community, there was significant disagreement about
whether the theory should be accepted. Many-perhaps most-scientists thought the
theory too absurd to take seriously, and so did not give up their belief that simultaneity is
absolute. The objector is committed to thinking that, in such a case, the initial proponent
of special relativity would not be justified in believing it. However, this does not seem
right. It can be rational for scientists (and philosophers) to maintain their views even in
the face of significant disagreement. Since disagreement would not be sufficient to
undermine justification in the philosophical assumptions required by scientific arguments
against common sense, it is not sufficient to undermine justification in the premises of
philosophical arguments against common sense.
Objection 5:
I concede that special relativity has overturned our belief that simultaneity is
absolute. The claim that simultaneity is absolute may be plausible, but it is not as basic,
as robust, or as central to our way of thinking as the kind of common sense beliefs that
philosophers attempt to undermine, such as the belief that I know I have hands or the
belief that tables exist. Science may be able to undermine widely-accepted propositions
that are highly plausible-like the proposition that tables are solid, that the earth is flat,
that the sun orbits the earth, and that simultaneity is absolute, but even science couldn't
undermine the real "hard core" of common sense that philosophical arguments target. So
examples from science like the example of special relativity don't really go any way
towards making it more plausible that philosophical arguments like the skeptical
argument could succeed.
Reply:
This objector is objecting to premise (1) of the simple statement of my argument
as it appears at the beginning of section 5, which is the premise that science can overturn
common sense. According to the objector, there is a "hard core" of common sense that
can't be overturned by any sort of inquiry, either scientific or philosophical, and this
"hard core" includes propositions in conflict with external world skepticism and
ontological nihilism.
Many of my opponents accept premise (1), and so I have simply presupposed it
up until this point, for reasons of dialectical effectiveness. However, I think this objector
makes a good point, and so I'll take up the issue here.
I don't want to rest my case on this, but I want to begin by saying that it's not
obvious that special relativity isn't in conflict with propositions just as central and basic
as the proposition that I know I have hands. Consider an ordinary simultaneity
proposition like the following: Andrew and I are brushing our teeth at the same time.
One might think-indeed, this is my view-that this proposition, as ordinarily
understood, could be true only if it is objectively and absolutely true that Andrew and I
are brushing our teeth at the same time.19 If so, then it is not merely the abstract and
theoretical-sounding proposition that simultaneity is absolute that is in conflict with
special relativity; rather, this theory is in conflict with propositions as ordinary, simple,
and plausible as any day-to-day simultaneity claim.2 0
Consider, also, the astronomical hypothesis that the earth orbits the sun. One
might be inclined to think that if this hypothesis is true, then my bed is not in the same
place it was yesterday. After all, the earth has moved somewhat, and so the region of
space formerly occupied by my bed is now occupied by something else. But the claim
that my bed is in the same place it was yesterday seems to me on par with the claim that I
know I have hands. This gives us some reason for being skeptical of the objector's claim
that the propositions overturned by science are not part of the "hard core" of common
sense that philosophers have attempted to undermine.
19 Similarly, one might think that ethical relativism is off the table because, as ordinarily understood,
propositions like "Torture is wrong" are true only if true absolutely. Part of what one is asserting when one
asserts that torture is wrong is that torture is wrong according to all legitimate perspectives.
20 Special relativity also entails that nothing can go faster than the speed of light. This may also seem to
conflict with some very basic commonsensical ideas. For example, suppose I am on a train going almost as
fast as the speed of light (but not quite) and I shoot a gun in the direction of the train's movement whose
bullets go half as fast as the speed of light. It seems like the bullet should end up going faster than the
speed of light. But according to special relativity, this is impossible. (Thanks to Brad Skow for suggesting
that I include this example.)
But I don't want to rest my case on these claims. Rather, I will argue that there
could be successful scientific arguments against the very claims that, according to the
objector, are in the "hard core" of common sense, and that these scientific arguments rely
crucially on philosophical assumptions.
Consider, for example, one of the common sense claims that the skeptic aims to
undermine: I know I have hands. Epistemologists agree that one could get empirical
evidence against this claim. For example, suppose one is told by a reliable source that
doctors have found a way to cure cancer by manufacturing a drug that requires some part
of a real human hand. People are being asked to donate their hands to the cause, so that
enough of this drug can be manufactured to cure everyone of cancer. Those who agree to
donate their hands are told they will undergo a surgical procedure under general
anesthesia which involves the removal of their hands and the replacement of them with
fake hands, which look and feel exactly like real hands, and from which there is no
recovery period. (We can imagine that surgery has become quite advanced.) You agree
to donate your hands. When you wake up in the hospital bed, you look down at the ends
of your arms, and find that what appear to be your hands look and function exactly as
they always have, just as you were told they would. In this case, I think you should
believe that you do not have real hands (just fake hands), and so give up the common
sense belief that you know you have hands. Moreover, in giving up this belief you are (at
least implicitly) relying on the epistemological assumption that the fake-hand hypothesis
is better supported by your evidence than the empirically equivalent conspiracy theory
according to which the doctors are all lying to you and your hands were never removed in
the first place.
Here's another example in which one could get empirical evidence against the
common sense belief that one has hands. Suppose you wake up one morning and find a
ticker-tape across the bottom of your visual field. The tape reads: "Your brain has been
removed from your body and put in a nutrient-filled vat. Your sensory experiences are
being fed to you by our vat-tending scientists." The tape goes on to make all sorts of
predictions about what your sensory experience will be like, and these predictions all
come true. In such a case, I think one should believe that one is a brain in a vat, and so
give up all of the common sense beliefs that are incompatible with that claim. But, once
again, in doing so one must rely at least implicitly on an epistemological claim according
to which the BIV hypothesis is more worthy of belief, given your evidence, than the
hypothesis that things really are as they seem, and that the ticker-tape is not reliable.
(Perhaps, according to this alternative hypothesis, you are hallucinating the ticker-tape
due to some kind of psychological ailment.)
It is worth pointing out about the kind of epistemological assumptions featured in
these cases are very similar in kind to the types of epistemological assumptions typically
appealed to in philosophical arguments for skepticism. For example, the skeptic may
employ the premise that your current sensory evidence is neutral between the BIV
hypothesis and the hypothesis that things are as they appear. The epistemological
assumptions appealed to in the above-described empirical arguments against common
sense are claims of a similar kind: claims about which hypotheses about the nature of the
real world are best supported by the evidence of your senses.
21 This example is not original to me, but I can't remember where I first heard it.
This completes my reply to this objection. I have argued that there could be
successful empirical arguments against the very same common sense propositions that
philosophical arguments seek to undermine. Moreover, these empirical arguments rely
crucially on philosophical assumptions. So, in the relevant sense, science can overturn
common sense and premise (1) of the argument remains intact.
8. Summary and Concluding Remarks
It has become popular to think of common sense is an oracle to which the
philosopher must always defer. If a philosopher's theory turns out to conflict with
common sense, the philosopher is taken to have overstepped her bounds and is expected
to retreat. It has been my aim in this chapter to convince the reader that this conception
of philosophy is untenable. Philosophical argument is perfectly capable of undermining
our ordinary, pre-theoretic view of the world.
In the first half of the chapter, I objected to the main motivations philosophers
have given for thinking that philosophy is not powerful enough to overturn common
sense. These motivations all turned out to rely on faulty theories of philosophical
methodology. In the second half of the chapter, I argued that if (as my opponents agree)
science can overturn common sense, then so can philosophy.
One consequence is that we cannot simply dismiss out of hand philosophical
arguments-like arguments for skepticism and arguments for ontological nihilism-that
target common sense claims. We cannot know in advance that our ordinary beliefs will
stand fast in the face of such arguments; only careful and detailed consideration of these
arguments can reveal whether or not they succeed. This brings a heightened sense of
importance and urgency to philosophical inquiry. Nothing less than our most basic and
central beliefs are at stake.
Reasoning One's Way out of Skepticism
0. Introduction
What can be said to someone who accepts the traditional philosophical argument
for external world skepticism? This person suspends judgment on every external world
proposition-she is uncertain about whether she has hands, whether there are trees,
whether there are other people, etc. Is there any line of reasoning that could persuade
someone in this position to give up her skepticism?
Many contemporary epistemologists think that it is not possible to convince the
skeptic that we have knowledge of the external world, and they don't aim to do so in their
responses to skepticism. Here, for example, is Timothy Williamson:
Nothing said here should convince someone who has given up ordinary beliefs
that they [ordinary external world beliefs] constitute knowledge...This is the
usual case with philosophical treatments of skepticism: they are better at
prevention than at cure. If a refutation of skepticism is supposed to reason one
out of the hole, then skepticism is irrefutable. (emphasis mine)
Here is James Pryor:
The ambitious anti-skeptical project is to refute the skeptic on his own terms, that
is, to establish that we can justifiably believe and know such things as that there is
a hand, using only premises that the skeptic allows us to use. The prospects for
this ambitious anti-skeptical project seem somewhat dim.. .Most fallibilists
concede that we can't demonstrate to the skeptic, using only premises he'll
accept, that we have any perceptual knowledge.... the ambitious anti-skeptical
project cannot succeed. (emphasis mine)
It is my aim to do what these (and other) epistemologists think can't be done. I
think that it is possible to rationally persuade the external world skeptic that we have
external world knowledge. The primary aim of this chapter is to argue that rationality
requires us to believe that skepticism is false, while appealing only to premises that even
an external world skeptic should accept. My strategy is to argue that accepting the
argument for external world skepticism ultimately commits one to accepting more
extreme forms of skepticism that are self-undermining.
First I argue that it is not rational to accept the argument for external world
skepticism. In section 1 I present the argument for skepticism about the external world,
and show that there is a parallel argument for skepticism about the past. So, I claim, if
one accepts external world skepticism, one ought to also accept skepticism about the past.
In section 2 I argue that anyone who accepts skepticism about the past should also accept
skepticism about complex reasoning. In section 3 I argue that it would be self-
undermining to accept skepticism about complex reasoning on the basis of this argument
from skepticism about the past, since this argument is complex. In particular, if one
22 Williamson (2000, 27)
23 Pryor (2000, 517 and 520)
accepts the argument for skepticism about complex reasoning, one will end up believing
a proposition P while at the same time believing that one should not believe P. This is
not a rational combination of beliefs. So, I conclude (in section 4) that it is not rational to
accept the argument for external world skepticism, because doing so ultimately commits
one to having an irrational combination of beliefs. Section 5 contains objections and
replies.
In Section 6, I go on to argue that it would not be rational to suspend judgment on
skepticism. This, combined with the conclusion of the argument presented earlier in
Sections 1 - 4, entails that if there is any doxastic attitude one could rationally take
towards external world skepticism, it is disbelief. In Section 7 I argue that, in general, for
any proposition P, there must be at least one doxastic attitude one could rationally take
towards P. Applied to the case at hand, and combined with the conditional just
mentioned, this entails that one must believe that skepticism is false.
This may remind some readers of Crispin Wright's 1991 paper "Scepticism and
Dreaming: Imploding the Demon." However, the structure of my argument is very
different from Wright's, and I think that Wright's project faces serious difficulties.24
Before moving on to the first step of my argument, I want to point out one final
difference between my project and most recent anti-skeptical projects. As noted earlier,
many-perhaps most-contemporary epistemologists do not claim that their arguments
could convince an external world skeptic. In this respect, my project is more ambitious
than theirs. However, there is another respect in which my project is less ambitious.
Unlike many recent anti-skeptics, I don't try to diagnose the flaw in the skeptical
argument-I don't isolate a particular premise as false, and explain why, despite its
falsity, we found it so compelling. In this respect (and probably this respect alone) my
project is similar to that of G.E. Moore, who also claimed to establish that we should
reject the skeptic's conclusion, but did not in the process diagnose the flaw in the
skeptic's argument.
1. External world skepticism leads to skepticism about the past
In this section I will argue that if it is rational to accept external world skepticism,
then it is rational to accept skepticism about the past.
I will begin by presenting a standard version of the argument for external world
skepticism. Then I will show that there is an analogous argument for skepticism about
the past.26 Anyone who is convinced by the former argument should also be convinced
by the latter.
24 Wright sets up the argument for external world skepticism in an unusual way. There is a different, more
common version of the argument which I think is superior to Wright's version, and to which Wright's
criticisms do not apply. So I think Wright fails to identify a serious problem for external world skepticism.
Wright's project is criticized in Brueckner (1992), Pritchard (2001) and Tymoczko and Vogel (1992). A
version of the objection just mentioned appears in Tymoczko and Vogel.
25 See, for example, Moore (1962).
26 There are in the literature many different ways of formulating the argument for external world
skepticism. The version I have presented here is, I think, one of the strongest and most fully developed.
But the different formulations all share a central basic strategy (originating in Descartes (1996)), and I think
this same basic strategy works equally well to motivate skepticism about the past, regardless of the details
of the way in which the argument is formulated.
Most people have many beliefs about the external world. For example, most
people tend to believe that the objects they seem to see before them, like hands and tables
and trees, really are there. I'll call the possibility in which the external world is largely as
you believe it to be the Normal World scenario.
Consider now an alternative possibility in which the way things appear to you is
exactly the same, but all of your external world beliefs are false.27 In this scenario you
are merely a bodiless brain in a vat, created by an evil scientist bent on deceiving you
about the nature of your surroundings. I'll call this possibility the BIV scenario.
The skeptic's first premise is as follows:
(1) One's basic evidence about the external world is restricted to propositions
about the way the external world appears to one. 28
The skeptic goes on to claim that this evidence is neutral between the Normal
World hypothesis and the BIV hypothesis; it doesn't favor one over the other. After all,
both hypotheses entail that one has the perceptual evidence that one does, e.g. that one
seems to see hands, tables, chairs, etc. Because there is no asymmetry in the degree to
which the hypotheses predict the evidence, there is no asymmetry in the degree to which
the evidence supports the hypotheses. 29 Here is the skeptic's second premise:
(2) Propositions about the way the external world appears to one are
evidentially neutral between the Normal World hypothesis and the BIV
hypothesis.
The third premise is as follows:
(3) Neither the Normal World hypothesis nor the BIV hypothesis is intrinsically
more worthy of belief, independently of one's evidence. 30
27 Strictly speaking, not all of your external world beliefs are false in this scenario. For example, in the
BIV scenario as I've described it, your belief that there is an external cause of your appearances is true. It's
an interesting question whether there is a possible scenario in which every one of your external world
beliefs is false, but it's not a question I'll take up here.
28 What do I mean by basic evidence? E is part of one's basic evidence for H just in case E is part of one's
evidence for H, and E is not believed on the basis of further evidence. The idea behind (1) is just that,
whatever the justificatory structure of one's external world beliefs, it all bottoms out in appearances;
appearances are the only original source of justificatory fluid, to use a metaphor from Field (1998).
29 I use the phrase "the degree to which the evidence supports the hypothesis" to pick out the notion of
incremental support, not overall support. On this picture, the overall worthiness of belief of a hypothesis H
depends both on (1) how worthy it is of belief, independently of one's evidence and (2) how much
incremental support is accorded to the hypothesis as a result of learning one's evidence.
30 Features that are sometimes thought to make one hypothesis intrinsically more worthy of belief than
another include the overall simplicity of the hypothesis and the degree to which its different parts hang
together well (are unified or coherent). In putting forward premise (3), the skeptic is either denying that the
normal world hypothesis is simpler or more unified than the BIV hypothesis, or denying that differences of
this kind make for greater worthiness of belief.
From (1) - (3), it follows that one neither knows, nor is justified in believing, that
the BIV hypothesis is false. From here we need just one more premise to yield full-on
external world skepticism:
(4) If one neither knows nor is justified in believing Q, and one knows that P
entails Q, then one must neither know nor be justified in believing P.
This final premise, often called the closure principle, is highly compelling;3 1 after
all, if one did know P or believe it with justification, then one would deduce Q from it,
and thereby come to know Q (or believe it with justification).
(1) - (4) yield the skeptic's conclusion:
(5) For every external world proposition P, no one could ever know or be
justified in believing P.
I will now present an argument for skepticism about the past that is perfectly
analogous to the argument for skepticism about the external world.
First, consider a more detailed version of the BIV scenario described above. In
addition to deceiving you about your external surroundings, we now suppose that the evil
scientist also wants to deceive you about your past. Due to budgetary constraints, the
scientist can afford to keep your brain in existence for only one minute; but, since he
wants to simulate a typical human experience, he implanted your brain with false
apparent memories such that what it's like to have these apparent memories is exactly the
same as what it's like for you in the Normal World scenario to really remember what
happened to you. I'll call this more detailed version of the BIV scenario the BIV(NoPast)
scenario.32 The role that the BIV(NoPast) scenario plays in the argument for skepticism
about the past is exactly the same as the role that the BIV scenario plays in the argument
for skepticism about the external world.
We will also make a further stipulation about the Normal World scenario, for the
purpose of contrasting it with the BIV(NoPast) scenario. In the following discussion,
"Normal World scenario" will refer to a scenario in which the past, as well as the external
world, is largely as you believe it to be.
We can now formulate the argument for skepticism about the past. We simply
take our argument for external world skepticism, and replace "the external world" with
"the past," and substitute BIV(NoPast) for BIV:
(1*) One's evidence about the past is restricted to propositions about the way the
past appears to one (i.e. the way one seems to remember things to have
been).
31 Of course, that's not to say it hasn't been contested. Dretske (1970) and Nozick (1981) are two
prominent deniers of the closure principle for knowledge. Note, however, that it is far less common, and
far more implausible, to deny that justification is closed. The argument for skepticism about justification
remains intact even if closure for knowledge is rejected.
32 Perhaps the most famous skeptical scenario concerning the past is Russell's (1921, 159) five-minute
world hypothesis, according to which the world sprang into existence five minutes ago, complete with a
group of people who seem to remember what we actually remember.
(2*) Propositions about the way the past appears to one are evidentially neutral
between the Normal World hypothesis and the BIV(NoPast) hypothesis.
(3*) Neither the Normal World hypothesis nor the BIV(NoPast) hypothesis is
intrinsically more worthy of belief, independently of one's evidence.
(4*) If one neither knows nor is justified in believing Q, and one knows that P
entails Q, then one must neither know nor be justified in believing P.
Therefore,
(5*) One neither knows nor is justified in believing any proposition about the
past.
Anyone who accepts the premises of the argument for external world skepticism
((1) - (4)) is thereby committed to accepting the premises of the argument for skepticism
about the past ((1*) - (4*)). It would be unacceptably arbitrary to accept (1) while
rejecting (1*). (2*) can be given the same justification that was given for (2). Any
reason one might have for rejecting (3*) would provide an equally good reason for
rejecting (3), so one who accepts (3) should also accept (3*). (4) and (4*) are identical.
In this section, I have argued for the following claim:
Claim I: If it is rational to accept external world skepticism, then it is rational to
accept skepticism about the past.
2. Skepticism about the past leads to skepticism about complex reasoning
In this section I will argue that if it's rational to accept skepticism about the past,
then it's rational to accept skepticism about complex reasoning. The rough idea behind
the argument is this: In complex reasoning one relies on one's memory. But if skepticism
about the past is true, one is not justified in relying on one's memory, and so not justified
in believing the conclusions of complex reasoning.
First I will say what I mean by complex reasoning, and what I mean by skepticism
about complex reasoning. For my purposes, a piece of reasoning counts as complex just
in case it involves multiple steps such that not all of these steps can be held in one's head
at once. For example, suppose one begins with the assumption that A is true, and then
infers (either deductively or inductively) B from A, C from B, and so on, and finally
concludes that G is true. Suppose that, by the time one infers G from F, one no longer
has in one's head the details of the argument by which one reasoned from A to G; one
simply seems to remember having done so. Then the reasoning from A to G counts as
complex. Most proofs in math and logic are examples of complex reasoning; so are long
inductive arguments for, say, the claim that global warming will occur, or the claim that
the stock market will have an average annual return of at least 8% over the next century.
Most interesting philosophical arguments are complex.
Skepticism about complex reasoning is the view that no one could ever know, or
be justified in believing, any proposition on the basis of complex reasoning. That is, one
could not come to know, or come to be justified in believing, a proposition P as a result
of having reasoned through a complex argument for P.
I will now present an argument for skepticism about complex reasoning which has
skepticism about the past as a premise. Let G be the conclusion of an arbitrary complex
argument. Consider an agent who is initially not justified in believing G. She then
carefully and correctly goes through the argument for G. Since the argument is complex,
at the moment she concludes that G is true, she doesn't have in her head the earlier steps
of the argument. She merely seems to remember that she went through some argument or
other for G. But if skepticism about the past is true, she is not justified in trusting her
apparent memory, because she is not justified in believing any proposition about the past.
For all she knows, she hasn't even been in existence long enough to have gone through
an argument for G. So, by the time she concludes that G is true, she is not justified in
believing it.
So, if skepticism about the past is true, then despite having gone through a
complex argument for G, the agent is not justified in believing it. Since we made no
assumptions about the argument other than that it was complex, it follows from
skepticism about the past that one cannot come to be justified in believing a proposition
as a result of having gone through a complex argument for it.33
Any skeptic about the past should accept this argument for skepticism about
complex reasoning.
Some readers may have lingering doubts about one crucial step in the above
argument. The following was required to get from skepticism about the past to
skepticism about complex reasoning:
(*) If an agent does not have in her head the argument for G, is not justified in
trusting her apparent memory that she went through an argument for G, and
has no independent reason for believing G, then she is not justified in
believing G, even if she did in fact go through a good argument for G.
The following case helps bring out the plausibility of this claim. As before,
consider an agent who has gone through a complex argument for G; prior to going
through the argument, he was not justified in believing G. At the moment he concludes
that G is true, he does not have in his head the argument for G. Since we're not skeptics
about the past, most of us think that he's justified in trusting his apparent memory that he
went through some argument for G, and thus justified in believing G. Let us suppose,
however, that he learns that he was given a "faulty memory" pill, which tends to cause
one to remember things that did not in fact happen. I think we should all agree that in
light of this information, the agent is not justified in believing G. Moreover, I think it's
clear that the way this information undermines his justification for G is by undermining
his justification for trusting his apparent memory that he went through an argument for G.
Crucially, it is because the agent is not justified in believing that he went through an
argument for G that he is not justified in believing G. The assumption that (*) is true
33 Since knowledge requires justification, showing that one cannot become justified in a proposition on the
basis of complex reasoning suffices to show that one cannot come to know the proposition on the basis of
complex reasoning.
provides the best explanation for the fact that the agent is not justified in believing G in
this case.
The claim that the agent in this case is not justified in believing G, and claim (*),
would both be rejected by a certain kind of reliabilist. According to this reliabilist,
having come to believe P via a reliable process is always sufficient for justification in P,
even if one has good reason to doubt that one went through a reliable process, as in the
case just described.
Although I am not much tempted by this reliabilist view, for my purposes I do not
need to assume that it is false, since I do not need to assume that (*) is correct. I need
assume only that any skeptic about the past would accept (*), since my goal is to show
that any skeptic about the past would accept the above argument for skepticism about
complex reasoning, which relies on (*). No skeptic about the past would accept this
reliabilist view of justification, since such a view straightforwardly conflicts with
skepticism about the past. Since only reliabilists would be tempted to reject (*), we can
be sure that any skeptic about the past would accept it.35
In this section, I have defended the following claim:
Claim II: If it's rational to accept skepticism about the past, then it's rational to
accept the argument from skepticism about the past to skepticism
about complex reasoning.
3. It is not rational to accept the argument from skepticism about the past to
skepticism about complex reasoning
In section 2 I described an argument from skepticism about the past to skepticism
about complex reasoning. In this section I will argue that it would not be rational to
accept this argument.
First, notice that this argument is itself a complex argument. Since its conclusion
is the claim that one ought not accept complex arguments, there is a sense in which the
argument is self-undermining. As I will show in this section, the self-undermining
34 One might think that (*) would be rejected by Tyler Burge, given his stance in a well-known dispute with
Roderick Chisholm (see Burge (1993) and Chisholm (1977)). However, I think both Burge and Chisholm
would accept (*). Burge and Chisholm disagree about whether certain contingent propositions about the
past are part of one's justification for the conclusion of a complex argument. Chisholm says yes; Burge
says no. It is clear that Chisholm would accept (*). Although Burge denies that propositions about the past
are part of one's justification for G, he does allow that there is some sense in which one relies on one's
memory in complex reasoning. In particular, he thinks that if one has a good positive reason for doubting
one's memory, then one should not believe the conclusions of complex reasoning. This is basically what
(*) says. As written, the antecedent of (*) says that an agent is not justified in believing what she seems to
remember. That is, it is not rational for the agent to believe what she seems to remember. On Burge's
view, if this is true, then it must be that S has a good positive reason for doubting her memory. Burge
agrees that the consequent of (*) follows from this (the consequent of (*) says that the agent should not
believe the conclusion of a complex argument). So Burge would agree with (*).
* I should say that strictly speaking, one could, without logical inconsistency, hold the position that
reliabilism is true for propositions believed on the basis of a complex argument, but false for propositions
believed on the basis of memory. However, in the absence of some reason for thinking that reliabilism
holds in the former case but fails in the latter case, I think this position is unacceptably arbitrary.
character of this argument manifests itself in the fact that if one accepts it, one will end
up believing a proposition P while at the same time believing that one should not believe
P.36 This is an irrational combination of beliefs. So it would not be rational to accept this
argument, since anyone who does so will end up with an irrational combination of
beliefs.
Let us suppose, then, that one were to accept the argument from skepticism about
the past to complex reasoning skepticism. Let P be the conclusion of this argument (i.e.
the thesis of skepticism about complex reasoning). At the moment one accepts P, one
knows that one is not accepting it on the basis of a simple argument. After all, if one
were accepting it on the basis of a simple argument, one would have all of the steps of
that argument in one's head at the moment one accepts P. However, one can tell at the
moment of acceptance that one does not have in one's head all the steps of an argument
for P.
Since one knows that one is not accepting P on the basis of a simple argument,
one knows that one of the two remaining possibilities obtains: either one is accepting P
on the basis of a complex argument, or one's acceptance of P is not based on any
argument at all. Since one is a skeptic about complex reasoning, one believes that if the
first possibility obtains, one is not justified in believing P. Consider now the second
possibility. Recall that P is the proposition that skepticism about complex reasoning is
true. Perhaps there are some propositions one could rationally come to believe without
basing one's belief on an argument (2 + 2 = 4 is a candidate), but if there are, skepticism
about complex reasoning is not one of them. 37 It is a highly surprising claim, far from
obvious. So one also believes that if the second possibility obtains, one is not justified in
believing P. So, one believes that one is not justified in believing P, no matter which of
these two possibilities obtains.
That is, at the moment one accepts the conclusion of the argument for skepticism
about complex reasoning, one believes P and one also believes that one's belief in P is
not justified. But this is clearly not a rational combination of beliefs. So one should not
accept the argument from skepticism about the past to skepticism about complex
reasoning, because if one were to do so, one would end up with an irrational combination
of beliefs.
The argument just presented relies crucially on the following principle:
Anti-Denouncement: It is not rational to believe a proposition P while also
believing that it is not rational for one to believe P.
The idea behind this principle is that it is not rational for one to denounce one's
own belief, in the sense of believing it to be irrational. It is very natural to think that this
principle is correct, and it is not my purpose in this chapter to provide a rigorous
36 I use the phrase "S should believe P" to mean "Rationality requires that S believe P."
37 Even if one denies this, the position one is in after accepting the argument is not rational. One believes
P, but, because of one's skepticism about the past, one suspends judgment on the proposition that one came
to believe P on the basis of a complex argument. That is, one suspends judgment on the proposition that
one shouldn't believe P (since one believes one shouldn't believe propositions on the basis of complex
arguments). But it is not rational to believe a proposition P while suspending judgment on whether one
should believe P. This violates Belief Endorsement, a plausible principle of epistemic rationality that
appears in section 6.
arument for Anti-Denouncement capable of convincing someone who disagrees 
with
it. 8 However, reflection on cases of the following kind may help to bring out the
plausibility of this principle.
Imagine someone-let's call him Bill-who's wondering whether it would be a
good idea for him to invest his retirement savings in the stock market. He's sure of the
following conditional claim: If the market will have an average annual return of at least
8% over the next few decades, then he ought to invest his savings in the market.
Naturally, he then turns to the question of whether the antecedent of this conditional is
true.
Suppose that, upon careful consideration of the evidence available to him, Bill
concludes that, given his evidence, he definitely should not believe that the market will
return at least 8%. This belief, he is sure, would not be rational, given his evidence. But
suppose further that, despite this, he does believe that the market will return at least 8%,
and decides on that basis to invest his savings entirely in the market. I think that in this
case, Bill should be regarded as epistemically irrational. A rational person would not
believe that the market will return at least 8% while also believing at the same time that,
given his evidence, he should believe no such thing.
This judgment about this case strongly suggests that Anti-Denouncement is true.
If Anti-Denouncement were false, it's hard to see what could be wrong with Bill's
beliefs. But it seems clear that they are not the beliefs of a rational person.
In this section I have defended the following claim:
Claim III: It is not rational to accept the argument from skepticism about the past
to complex reasoning skepticism.
4. It is not rational to accept external world skepticism
To summarize, in this section I'll bring together the three claims defended in
sections 1 - 3. They entail that it is not rational to accept external world skepticism.
Claim I: If it's rational to accept external world skepticism, then it's rational to
accept skepticism about the past.
Claim II: If it's rational to accept skepticism about the past, then it's rational to
accept the argument from skepticism about the past to skepticism about
complex reasoning.
Subconclusion: If it's rational to accept external world skepticism, then it's rational to
accept the argument from skepticism about the past to skepticism about
complex reasoning.
Claim III: It is not rational to accept the argument from skepticism about the past to
skepticism about complex reasoning.
38 Like most claims in philosophy, not everyone agrees with this principle. Weatherson (unpublished
manuscript) and Williamson (forthcoming) argue against it. The principle has been defended by Feldman
(2005) and Bergmann (2005). It is also discussed in Christensen (forthcoming).
It is not rational to accept external world skepticism.
5. Objections and Replies
In this section, I'll present and respond to some objections to the argument just
presented.
Objection I:
You claim that anyone who accepts the argument for external world skepticism is
ultimately committed to believing a proposition P while at the same time believing that
she should not believe P. But there is a way to accept the argument for external world
skepticism without being committed to that combination of beliefs. Consider someone
who thinks that there is an independent but compelling simple argument for skepticism
about complex reasoning, and who also thinks (rightly or wrongly) that the argument for
external world skepticism is simple. This person would accept external world skepticism
on the basis of the purportedly simple argument for it, and would also accept skepticism
about complex reasoning on the basis of the purportedly simple argument for it. Since
she already accepts skepticism about complex reasoning for independent reasons, she
would not accept the complex argument from external world skepticism to skepticism
about complex reasoning. So she would not end up believing a proposition P while
believing that she shouldn't believe P.
Reply:
The position that the objector describes is rational only if there is a simple
argument for skepticism about complex reasoning that could be rationally accepted. But
I claim that any plausible simple argument for skepticism about complex reasoning
would also be an argument for completely global skepticism. It is not rational to accept
any argument for global skepticism-according to which one neither knows nor is
justified in believing any proposition-because accepting this argument involves
believing a proposition, which global skepticism says one ought not do. Anyone who
accepts global skepticism believes a proposition P while believing that one should not
believe P, which is not a rational combination of beliefs.
I will now give my reasons for thinking that any plausible simple argument for
skepticism about complex reasoning would also be an argument for global skepticism.
First, I am aware of only one argument for skepticism about complex reasoning which is
prima facie plausible and may be considered simple, and it is clearly an argument for
global skepticism. The argument is roughly as follows: For any proposition P, it is
possible that an evil demon could make not-P seem just as plausible to me as P seems
now. Therefore, the fact that P seems highly plausible to me now is not sufficient for me
to be justified in believing P, or to know P.
So the only plausible simple argument that has so far been been formulated is also
an argument for global skepticism. But there are more general reasons to think that any
argument for skepticism about complex reasoning, if simple, yields global skepticism. If
Conclusion:
a skeptical argument is to undermine only complex reasoning, and not yield global
skepticism, it must introduce, describe, and make claims about features specific to
complex reasoning. But this would involve complicating the argument, and so it would
likely no longer be simple. Moreover, the only epistemically relevant difference between
complex reasoning and simple reasoning is that the former relies on memory. So we
might naturally expect any skeptical argument that is restricted to complex reasoning to
go by way of skepticism about the past. But, as we saw in section 2, arguments of this
type are complex.
In summary, in order for the objection to succeed, there must be a plausible
argument for skepticism about complex reasoning that is simple and that doesn't yield
global skepticism. But I don't think there is such an argument.
Objection II:
Your argument in section 3 for claim III, the claim that it is not rational to accept
the argument from skepticism about the past to skepticism about complex reasoning, rests
on the assumption that this argument is complex. But it's not clear to me that this
argument is complex.
Reply:
I think it's plausible that this argument is complex; I, at least, am not able to hold
the argument in its entirety in my head at once. However, my argument would go
through even on the assumption that this argument is simple, since this argument is in
fact only a small part of the overall argument for skepticism about complex reasoning.
The overall argument includes the argument for skepticism about the past, and the
arguments for the premises of the argument for skepticism about the past (from the
parallel with the argument for external world skepticism).
That is, the entire argument for skepticism about complex reasoning includes the
argument for external world skepticism, the argument linking external world skepticism
to skepticism about the past (consisting of conditional claims of the following form: if
premise (x) of the argument for external world skepticism is true, then premise (x*) of the
argument for skepticism about the past is true), the argument for skepticism about the
past, and the argument from skepticism about the past to skepticism about complex
reasoning. This argument is surely complex.
Objection III:
I grant that, for actual humans, the argument for skepticism about complex
reasoning is complex, since we are unable to hold this entire argument in our heads at
once. However, whether an argument is complex or simple is agent-relative; it is
(metaphysically) possible for there to be an agent, who although in all other respects is
just like us, is able to hold incredibly long arguments in her head at once. In particular,
she can hold in her head the entire argument for skepticism about complex reasoning.
For this agent, this argument is simple, and so it would not be self-undermining for her to
accept it-there is nothing self-undermining about accepting a simple argument for
skepticism about complex reasoning. Since this agent is in all other respects just like us,
we can suppose that she finds each premise of the argument individually plausible, and
so, since the argument is simple for her, she will accept it, and come to believe
skepticism about the external world, the past, and complex reasoning. In short: if there
were an agent with certain enhanced cognitive abilities, she would be a skeptic.
The reasoning just given should be accepted by anyone who accepts the argument
you've given. Such a person would then be in the following peculiar situation: because
she accepts your argument, she thinks it would not be rational for her to believe
skepticism, and so she doesn't believe it. But, at the same time, she knows that if there
were an agent just like her, except with certain enhanced cognitive abilities, then that
agent would believe skepticism. This combination of beliefs is not rational, according to
the following principle.
Deference: If one (rationally) believes that a cognitively enhanced version of
oneself would believe P, then one should believe P.
Deference is very plausible. Consider the following case. Suppose you're
uncertain about whether Goldbach's conjecture can be proved. You then learn that if
there were a version of yourself with enhanced cognitive abilities-for example,
enhanced mathematical abilities-that enhanced agent would believe that there is a proof
of Goldbach's conjecture. Plausibly, upon learning this information you should come to
believe that there is such a proof. But if so, this suggests that Deference is true. And if
Deference is true, then it would not be rational to accept the argument you've given.39
Reply:
I agree with the objector that Deference is plausible, and I agree that the
Goldbach's Conjecture case shows that something in the vicinity of this principle must be
true. Nevertheless, we have independent reason for thinking that Deference as stated is
not true. I will argue that the properly revised version of Deference does not have the
consequence that anyone who accepts my argument has an irrational combination of
beliefs.
First, though, I would like to note that the objector is not obviously correct in his
assumption that an enhanced agent would believe skepticism. It might be that if one were
enhanced in this way, one would no longer believe the skeptic's premises. Also, even
supposing that the enhanced agent would believe skepticism, the non-skeptic may have
39 For parallel reasons, the non-skeptic is committed to a possible violation of the following principle,
which is in the spirit of van Fraassen's (1984) reflection principle: Reflection: If one (rationally) believes
that one's future self will believe P, then one should believe P. Suppose the non-skeptic were offered a pill
that would give her the cognitive abilities of the enhanced agent-in other words, a pill that would turn her
into the enhanced agent. It would clearly be foolish to turn down such a pill-after all, it enhances one's
abilities, and, we can suppose, has no side effects. So, if the non-skeptic is offered the pill, she should
decide to take it, and so should believe that her future self, who has taken the pill, will accept the argument
for skepticism. So, according to Reflection, she should believe skepticism now, even before taking the pill.
The dialectic here is perfectly parallel to the dialectic concerning the non-skeptic's violation of Deference.
The same kind of response I give to the objection that the non-skeptic violates Deference can be given to
the objection that the non-skeptic violates Reflection.
good reasons for thinking that an ideally rational agent would not.4 0 (Since the enhanced
agent is just like us in every respect other than this particular enhancement, she is not
ideally rational.) Nevertheless, for the remainder of my reply I will assume that the
objector is right to think that the enhanced agent would accept skepticism, since I think
that the objection fails in any case, because the key principle on which it relies does not
hold in the case of the non-skeptic.
The following consideration shows that Deference, as stated, is not true. As the
objector noted, we have very good reason to think that there doesn't actually exist any
enhanced agent of the kind described in his objection. However, according to Deference,
we should believe that such an agent does exist. This is because we recognize that if
there were an enhanced agent, she would know that she is enhanced in a certain way, and
so she would believe that an enhanced agent (namely, herself) exists. According to
Deference, one should believe whatever one knows that an enhanced agent would
believe, so according to Deference, one should believe that an enhanced agent actually
exists. Clearly this is the wrong result, and so Deference, as stated, is not true. 41,42
Nevertheless, the Goldbach's conjecture case described by the objector shows that
some principle in the vicinity of Deference must be true. For us, then, the crucial
question is this: Will the correct version of Deference (whatever it is) still entail that it
would not be rational to decline skepticism on the basis of my argument? Or is this just
another example in which Deference, as originally formulated, gets the wrong result?
I think we have independent reason for thinking that the second possibility
obtains. This is because there is another counterexample to Deference, and the most
natural explanation for why Deference fails in this case has the consequence that
Deference fails in the case of the non-skeptic as well.
Suppose one learns that, if there were an enhanced version of oneself, that
enhanced agent would believe that Deference is false. In particular, the enhanced agent
would believe the following: the fact that an enhanced version of oneself believes P is
never a good reason for believing P. According to Deference, upon learning this, one
should come to believe that Deference is false. But that is clearly not the rational
response to the situation. To do this would be self-undermining. It would not be rational
to believe, on the basis of Deference, that Deference is false. To do so would be to
believe a proposition P (that one should never adopt a belief on the basis of Deference)
while believing that one should not believe P (because the basis for one's belief in P is
that Deference says one ought to believe it).
This suggests that Deference fails in cases in which, if one were to believe what
one believes that the enhanced agent would believe, one's position would be self-
40 Assuming that the non-skeptic believes that skepticism is false (rather than merely failing to believe that
it's true), she must believe that one of the skeptic's premises is false. It might seem plausible that an
ideally rational agent would believe every true necessary proposition. If so, then the non-skeptic must
think that an ideally rational agent would disbelieve whichever premise of the skeptical argument is in fact
false, and so would not be a skeptic.
41 Similar arguments appear in Plantinga (1982).
42 One might respond to this objection by modifying Deference as follows: One should believe whatever
one (rationally) believes that an enhanced agent would advise one to believe. The thought is that an
enhanced agent would not advise you to believe that an enhanced agent exists, even though she herself
believes it. The question is then whether the enhanced agent would advise you to believe skepticism. The
rest of my reply to this objection could be seen as a reason for thinking that she would not.
undermining (in the sense that one would believe P while believing that one should not
believe P).
But this is true of the person who accepts my argument. Suppose this non-skeptic
were to adopt the belief, on the basis of Deference, that skepticism is true. That is,
suppose she were to reason as follows: An enhanced agent would believe skepticism.
One should believe whatever one believes that an enhanced agent would believe. So I
should believe skepticism.
If she accepts skepticism on the basis of this argument, her position is self-
undermining,4 3 because the above argument for skepticism about complex reasoning is
complex. (This is because it relies on the assumption that an enhanced agent would
believe skepticism, and the argument for this is complex.)
I take this to show that Deference gives the wrong result in the case of the agent
who, on the basis of my argument, gives up the belief that skepticism is true. This is
because we have independent reason to believe that Deference fails in cases in which
following it would lead one into a self-undermining position, and this is true in the case
of the non-skeptic.
More can be said to explain why Deference fails in such cases. I think the
plausibility of principles like Deference stems from a picture we have about the role of
idealized agents in epistemology. According to this picture, the rationality of one's
position increases as one's position becomes more similar, overall, to the position of an
idealized agent. One important respect of similarity concerns the contents of one's
beliefs. Other things equal, adopting beliefs that are shared by an idealized agent makes
one's position more rational. That is why this picture makes Deference seem plausible.
But this very same picture also explains why Deference fails in certain cases.
Similarity in the contents of one's beliefs is not the only kind of similarity that counts. 44
Moreover, sometimes, for limited agents, becoming more similar in the content of one's
beliefs involves becoming less similar in another important respect. Deference fails to
take this into account; it focuses on only one respect of similarity.
The position of the limited agent, the non-skeptic, differs from the position of the
enhanced agent in that the former does not believe skepticism, but the latter does.
However, the positions of the limited agent and the enhanced agent are similar in the
following important respect: both positions are not self-undermining. If the limited agent
were to adopt the enhanced agent's belief, her position would become less similar in this
important respect, because her position would now be self-undermining. Deference fails
in this case because matching beliefs would make the limited agent overall less similar to
43 The argument for this can be spelled out in more detail as follows. She believes a proposition, P
(skepticism about complex reasoning). She knows that she does not believe P on the basis of a simple
argument (the argument in the above paragraph is not simple, because it relies on the claim that an
enhanced agent would believe skepticism; the argument for this is complex.). She also knows that P is not
the kind of proposition that could be rationally believed on the basis of no argument. The only remaining
possibility is that she believes P on the basis of a complex argument (this is in fact the case); but since she
accepts skepticism about complex reasoning, she believes that in this case she should not believe P. So she
believes P while believing that she should not believe P.
44 For example, consider a complex mathematical theorem M which one has no reason for believing. One
shouldn't believe M, even though an enhanced agent would (one doesn't know that an enhanced agent
would believe it.) This example makes the general point that the rationality of one's position depends on
more than just the overall similarity of the contents of one's beliefs to the contents of the beliefs of an
enhanced agent.
the enhanced agent, because it would make the limited agent's position self-undermining,
unlike the position of the enhanced agent.
So we see that the motivating idea behind Deference also helps explain why
Deference fails in certain cases, like the case of the non-skeptic. The motivating idea is
that one's position should be as similar as possible to the enhanced agent's position. The
problem is that Deference focuses on only one respect of similarity. Usually, this doesn't
matter, because becoming more similar in this respect doesn't usually make one less
similar in other respects. But occasionally, as in the case of the non-skeptic, it does. In
such cases, Deference fails.
6. It is not rational to suspend judgment on external world skepticism
So far I have presented an argument, which I think would be accepted by the
external world skeptic, for the claim that it is not rational to believe external world
skepticism. It might seem to some readers that, after having shown this, not much
argument is required to conclude that the skeptic should believe that skepticism is false.
After all, consider the intellectual history of the skeptic. Prior to encountering the
skeptical argument, she had a typical collection of ordinary beliefs, including the belief
that she knew many things about the world. Then, upon hearing the skeptical argument,
she was convinced by it, and gave up the belief that she had any external world
knowledge. Once my argument has succeeded in convincing the skeptic that it is not
rational to accept the skeptical argument, shouldn't the skeptic simply revert back to the
position she was in prior to encountering the argument? She now sees that accepting this
argument was a mistake; it was not rational for her to do so. So, it may seem that the
natural response is to re-adopt the position she would have maintained, had she not made
that particular mistake.
I find this line of thought compelling. However, not everyone is convinced by it.
Some think that at this point, rather than reverting to her original belief that she knows
many things about the world, the former skeptic should now suspend judgment on
skepticism. They think the skeptic should reason as follows: I've just seen that it's not
rational to accept the argument for external world skepticism, because doing so commits
one to an irrational combination of beliefs. However, this doesn't change the fact that the
premises of the skeptical argument are highly compelling. They are so compelling that it
couldn't possibly be rational to believe that one of them is false, so it couldn't be rational
to believe that external world skepticism is false. The only remaining option is to
suspend judgment on external world skepticism, so this is what I ought to do.
So, according to this line of thought, the skeptic should suspend judgment on
skepticism while believing, on the basis of the argument just given, that she ought to
suspend judgment on skepticism. I will call someone in this position a confident
suspender. (Later on we will encounter an unconfident suspender, who suspends
judgment on skepticism while suspending judgment on whether that is the attitude she
ought to have.)
The position of the confident suspender may sound very reasonable. However, I
will argue that this position is not rational-it has a defect very similar to the defect of
the position of the external world skeptic.
First, note that suspending judgment on external world skepticism commits one to
suspending judgment on other kinds of skepticism as well. In earlier sections of this
chapter, I argued that if one accepts external world skepticism, one must also accept
skepticism about the past and skepticism about complex reasoning. For parallel reasons,
if one suspends judgment on skepticism about the external world, one should also
suspend judgment on skepticism about the past and skepticism about complex
reasoning.45 We will assume that the confident suspender does so.
Now, however, we can begin to see where the problem lies. The confident
suspender believes a proposition P-the proposition that she ought to suspend judgment
on external world skepticism-on the basis of the argument sketched a few paragraphs
back. This argument is complex. (It relies on the claim that it's not rational to believe
external world skepticism, and the argument for this-the argument given in sections 1
through 4-is complex.) So the confident suspender believes P on the basis of a complex
argument, while suspending judgment on skepticism about complex reasoning. That is,
she believes P while suspending judgment about whether she ought to believe it. 46 In
doing so, she violates the following plausible principle of epistemic rationality:
Belief Endorsement: If one believes P, then if one takes any doxastic attitude
toward the proposition that it is rational to believe P, one
must believe it.
Belief Endorsement entails the Anti-Denouncement principle I appealed to in
chapter two. As with Anti-Denouncement, we can bring out the plausibility of Belief
Endorsement by thinking about a particular case in which one's attitudes fail to conform
to it.
Imagine, once again, that Bill is reflecting on future stock market returns. After
looking at the entire history of the US stock market, he concludes that his evidence
4 The argument for this is as follows. Assume one suspends judgment on external world skepticism. Any
reason one could have for believing skepticism about the past, or disbelieving it, would provide a parallel
reason for believing or disbelieving skepticism about the external world. Since one neither disbelieves nor
believes external world skepticism, one must not have any reason for believing or disbelieving skepticism
about the past, and so must suspend judgment on it. I showed in sections 1 through 4 that it's not rational
to believe skepticism about complex reasoning, since the only plausible arguments for it are complex, and
it's self-undermining to believe skepticism about complex reasoning on the basis of a complex argument.
Suppose one disbelieves skepticism about complex reasoning. In sections 1 through 4 I showed that if
skepticism about the past is true, then skepticism about complex reasoning is true. Anyone who disbelieves
skepticism about complex reasoning should infer from this conditional that skepticism about the past is
false. But the agent we're considering suspends judgment on skepticism about the past, and so this agent
must not disbelieve skepticism about complex reasoning. She must suspend judgment on it.
46 The careful reader will notice that this doesn't quite follow directly from the immediately preceding
sentence. It follows only if the agent in question believes that she believes P on the basis of a complex
argument. As someone who suspends judgment on skepticism about the past, she may not have this belief.
However, even if she does not believe that she believes P on the basis of a complex argument, she does
know that she doesn't believe P on the basis of a simple argument. (If she did, she would have that
argument in her head, and she does not.) The only other possibility is that she believes P for no reason
whatsoever. But she can tell that P isn't the kind of proposition that could rationally be believed for no
reason whatsoever. So, she knows that either she believes P for no reason whatsoever, in which case her
belief is irrational, or she believes P on the basis of a complex argument, in which case she suspends
judgment on whether her belief in P is rational, thereby violating Belief Endorsement.
supports the claim that the market will return an average of at least 8% over the next
couple of decades, and so he believes this claim. On the basis of this belief, he decides to
invest almost all of his retirement savings in the market. So far, so good. Suppose,
however, that he then learns of a period in Japanese history in which their stock market
had a decades-long period of stagnation, which was preceded by economic conditions
very much like the current economic conditions in the US. After learning this, he comes
to suspend judgment on the proposition that his evidence supports the claim that the
market will return at least 8%. "It's just too complicated for me to figure out," he thinks
to himself; "I have no idea what my evidence supports." Suppose though that, despite
this change in his second-order beliefs, his first-order beliefs remain the same. He
continues to believe that the market will return 8%, even though he suspends judgment
on the claim that this belief is rational, and he continues to let his investment decisions be
guided by this first-order belief. It seems clear that Bill's position is now epistemically
irrational. This is best explained by supposing that Belief Endorsement is true.
As noted above, the confident suspender has a combination of attitudes that don't
conform to Belief Endorsement. The confident suspender believes P-that one ought to
suspend judgment on external world skepticism-while suspending judgment on whether
she ought to believe P.
At this point it might seem that we must give up completely on idea that it could
be rational to suspend judgment on external world skepticism. But there is one more
possible position to consider- that of the unconfident suspender. 4 7 Both the confident
and the unconfident suspender suspend judgment on external world skepticism, and they
both also suspend judgment on skepticism about the past and skepticism about complex
reasoning. The confident suspender got into trouble by combining these attitudes with
the belief that he ought to suspend judgment on external world skepticism. The
unconfident suspender seeks to avoid this trouble by not believing this proposition.
Instead, he suspends judgment on it.48
Unfortunately the unconfident suspender thereby gets himself into a closely-
related kind of trouble. He suspends judgment on external world skepticism while
suspending judgment on whether he ought to suspend judgment on external world
skepticism, thereby violating the following principle:
Endorsement: If one takes doxastic attitude D towards P, then, if one
takes any doxastic attitude toward the proposition that it
is rational to take D to P, one must believe it.
Endorsement is just a generalization of Belief Endorsement. Belief Endorsement
says that rationality requires one to endorse one's own beliefs, in the sense of believing
them to be rational. But if this is true for belief, shouldn't it be true for the other doxastic
47 In fact, there is a third possible position: one could suspend judgment on skepticism while believing that
it is rational for one to do so, but not believe this on the basis of a complex argument. However, this
position is not rational because the claim that one ought to suspend judgment on skepticism is not the kind
of proposition that could be rationally believed on the basis of no argument at all. Moreover, I don't think
there are any plausible arguments for this proposition that are not complex.
48 The position of the unconfident suspender is the position that some scholars have taken to be the position
of the ancient Pyrrhonian skeptics. If this interpretation is right, then my argument here also serves as an
argument against Pyrrhonian skepticism.
attitudes as well? In epistemology, as elsewhere, we should aim for simplicity and
elegance in our theorizing. The simplest theory will treat all doxastic attitudes alike:
since Endorsement is true for belief, then it is true for all other doxastic attitudes as well.
If so, then the unconfident suspender fares no better than the confident suspender.
Although I find Endorsement very plausible, I know that some philosophers may
find Belief Endorsement and Anti-Denouncement much more plausible than
Endorsement. These philosophers may not agree with me that the unconfident suspender
is irrational just in virtue of violating Endorsement. Before simply agreeing to disagree,
I'd like to point out some other features of the unconfident suspender's position. Even if
one is unsure about whether Endorsement is true, one may agree with me that the
unconfident suspender's position is irrational in virtue of these other features.
First, note that the unconfident suspender originally adopted his position on the
basis of complex considerations of the sort described above. (He did not adopt his
position of radical uncertainty completely out of the blue; rather, it is only after seeing the
way in which skepticism is self-undermining that he adopted this position.) But, since he
suspends judgment on propositions about the past, and because these considerations are
complex, he knows nothing of them now. He knows that he is unsure of a great many
things, but he doesn't know why. This in itself plausibly makes his position irrational-
having adopted his position, he can no longer see any good reason for maintaining it.
Additionally, I think this fact would tend to make his position unstable. Suppose
the unconfident suspender happens to catch sight of one of his hands. He has a vivid
experience as of there being a hand before him, and is extremely tempted to believe that
he has a hand. It seems so obvious that there is a hand right before his very eyes! Not
only is he tempted to believe that there is a hand, he does not, it would seem, have any
good reason why he should not believe as he is tempted.
Now, of course, if a skeptic had this experience, she would have at the ready a
compelling argument for why it is that one shouldn't believe that one has a hand, namely
her original argument for skepticism. And the confident suspender would have at the
ready an argument for why one should suspend judgment on the proposition that one has
a hand.
But the unconfident suspender, since he believes so little, has no doxastic
resources with which to resist the temptation to believe that he has a hand.49 So it seems
he would be motivated to adopt that belief. So his position is unstable. It tends to
collapse into the position of disbelieving skepticism.
I have presented some reasons for thinking that it would not be rational to suspend
judgment on external world skepticism. I think I have made a strong case for the claim
that the confident suspender is irrational: his position violates the very plausible Belief
Endorsement principle. I have made a less strong but, I think, still compelling case for
the claim that the unconfident suspender is irrational.
49The reader may reply here that although he has no *beliefs* that give him reason to avoid believing that
he has a hand, he does have a doxastic attitude that would motivate him to suspend judgment-his attitude
of suspending judgment about whether skepticism is true. If, for all you know, external world skepticism
might be true, then it seems that you should not believe external world propositions. My response is that I
don't see why he would be motivated to maintain his attitude of suspending judgment on skepticism in light
of his experience as of a hand. Unlike the confident suspender, he does not have an argument for the claim
that he ought to suspend judgment.
7. Epistemic dilemmas are impossible
I have now argued that it is not rational to believe skepticism and that it is not
rational to suspend judgment on skepticism. At this point I think it is plausible to
conclude that we should believe that skepticism is false-after all, the only other two
options are untenable.
However, this doesn't quite follow from what I've shown so far. For all I've said,
it could be that we're caught in an epistemic dilemma: that all possible doxastic attitudes
one could take towards skepticism are irrational. In this section I will argue that, in
general, epistemic dilemmas are not possible.
The rough idea behind my argument is as follows. An epistemic dilemma is a
situation in which, for every doxastic attitude D, rationality requires that you not take D
to P. That is, rationality requires that you take no doxastic attitude at all towards P. But
it's not metaphysically possible for you to do this; you're bound to take some attitude or
other towards P. So, if there were an epistemic dilemma, there would be a situation in
which rationality requires you to do the impossible. But, since ought implies can, there
could be no such situation; so, there could not be an epistemic dilemma.
I'll now state the key assumptions of the argument more precisely, show how
together they yield my desired conclusion, and then provide defenses of them.
Definition of Epistemic Dilemma:
An epistemic dilemma is a situation in which, for some agent S and proposition P,
rationality requires that S not believe P, and rationality requires that S not disbelieve P,
and rationality requires that S not suspend judgment on P.
Export for Rationality:
For all doxastic attitudes Dl and D2 and propositions P1 and P2, if rationality requires
that one take D1 to P1 and rationality requires that one take D2 to P2, then rationality
requires that one take Dl to P1 and D2 to P2.
From these two assumptions it follows that an epistemic dilemma is a situation in
which, for some agent S and proposition P, rationality requires that S neither believe P
nor disbelieve P nor suspend judgment on P. However, it is not metaphysically possible
for S to neither believe nor disbelieve nor suspend judgment on P. 50  now appeal to the
following principle:
Minimal Epistemic "Ought Implies Can":
50 Some readers may want to resist at this point. Consider, for example, someone who is incapable of
understanding a proposition P, perhaps because he lacks the conceptual resources necessary to do so. He
doesn't believe P and he doesn't disbelieve P, either, but it sounds odd to say that he suspends judgment on
P. I'm happy to agree that this agent takes no doxastic attitude towards P. However, it seems to me that
rationality couldn't possibly require that one take no doxastic attitude towards external world skepticism-
rationality couldn't possibly require that one be unable to understand the proposition expressed by external
world skepticism. So, in the end, I think rationality does require that we take at least one doxastic attitude
towards external world skepticism.
Epistemic rationality can require that one be in a certain state only if it is metaphysically
possible for one to be in that state.
It follows that rationality could not require one to take no doxastic attitude
towards a proposition, since it is not metaphysically possible for one to do so; so,
epistemic dilemmas are impossible.
My argument relies crucially on Export for Rationality and the minimal epistemic
"ought implies can" principle. These principles are very plausible, but some
considerations might lead one to doubt them. I will now argue that we do not have any
good reason to doubt these very plausible principles.
I'll begin with Export for Rationality. It is easy to see the appeal of this principle.
Think about a particular case: suppose rationality requires you to believe that God is
omnipotent, and rationality requires you to believe that God is omnibenevolent. Does
rationality require you to believe that God is omnipotent, and also to believe that God is
omnibenevolent? The answer, it seems, must be yes. (Note that it doesn't follow from
export for rationality alone that rationality requires you to believe that God is omnipotent
and omnibenevolent. A multiple-premise closure principle would be required to yield
that further result.)
Some might object to export for rationality by claiming that an analogous
principle involving the moral "ought" is false:
Export for Morality: For all actions A and B, if one ought to perform
action A and one ought to perform action B, then
one ought to perform action A and perform action
B.51
Export for morality is, I think, just as prima facie plausible as export for
rationality. However, it is false if we accept a certain widely-held view about promising,
according to which, whenever you promise that you will do something, then you ought to
do it. Suppose you promise Anna that you will go to her birthday party, and you also
promise Clara that you will not go to Anna's birthday party. It follows from the view
stated above that you ought to go to Anna's birthday party and you ought to not go to
Anna's birthday party. However, it couldn't possibly be the case that you ought to both
go to Anna's birthday party and not go to Anna's birthday party (since this would violate
"ought implies can"). If we accept this view on promising, then, export for morality is
false. If so, says the objector, then this casts suspicion on export for rationality.
However, I don't think this example shows that export for morality is false;
rather, I think it shows that we need to reformulate our statement of the view about
promising. I agree with the objector that morality couldn't possibly require that one both
go and not go to Anna's birthday party. However, it is equally plausible to me that it
couldn't be the case that one ought to go Anna's birthday party and that one ought not go
to Anna's birthday party. The problem, I think, arises at an earlier stage. It arises with
our overly simplistic view on promising. We can revise this view as follows: if you
51 This principle is discussed in Williams and Atkinson (1965), where it is referred to as the agglomeration
principle.
promise someone that you'll perform action A, then you ought to do it, unless you have
promised someone else that you will do something incompatible with performing action
A. According to this version of the view, the fact that you have promised Clara that
you'll not go to Anna's birthday party means that you are not morally required to go,
even though you have promised Anna that you would.
One might object that this version of the view can't be right, because it lets you
get out of your obligation to keep your promises just by making contradictory promises.
Suppose that, having promised to do something, you no longer feel like doing it; it seems
that on this view, you can get out of your obligation to do it, and do nothing wrong, just
by promising someone else not to do it. However, this problem vanishes if we elaborate
the view by adding the following plausible principle: One ought not make contradictory
promises.
I think this subtler view fits better with our ordinary thinking about promise-
keeping. Suppose that, in the example above, you end up not going to Anna's birthday
party. When Anna finds out what happened, I think Anna would reproach you by saying
something like, "Why did you promise Clara you wouldn't attend my birthday party,
after promising me that you would?" rather than by saying "Why, having promised to
attend my birthday party and having promised Clara not to attend, did you then not
come?" So I think that the most plausible view on promising is compatible with export
for morality. Thus, we do not have a compelling reason to doubt export for rationality.
I'll now discuss my epistemic "ought implies can" principle. There are many
different versions of this principle, and some of them have been justly criticized by
epistemologists. For example, versions of this principle involving psychological or
nomological possibility don't seem right. Epistemic rationality may require me to
believe that plane flights are generally safe even if I am psychologically unable to do
so. However, my preferred minimal version of epistemic "ought implies can" escapes
objections of this sort. It is metaphysically possible to believe that plane flights are
generally safe, even if it's not psychologically possible, and so it is compatible with my
version of the principle that rationality requires that one do so. So I think this version is
sufficiently minimal to be highly plausible. A detailed and plausible defense of this
principle can be found in Greco (unpublished ms).
This concludes my main argument for the claim that epistemic dilemmas are not
possible. I'll now go on to give an argument for a slightly different, but related claim:
that no one could ever rationally believe that they are in an epistemic dilemma. If true, I
think this provides some additional support for the idea that epistemic dilemmas aren't
possible.
In particular, I'll show that it follows from the Endorsement principle discussed
above that no one could ever rationally believe that they are in an epistemic dilemma.
Consider a proposition P such that one might be in an epistemic dilemma with respect to
P. Suppose first that the agent believes P. In that case, according to Belief Endorsement,
the agent must believe that this belief is rational, and so the agent shouldn't believe that
she's in an epistemic dilemma.53 Suppose, alternatively, that the agent believes that P is
52 Greco (unpublished ms), Feldman (2000), Alston (1988), and Lycan (1985) all make similar points. The
principle is defended in Dretske (2000).
53 The careful reader will note that this only follows from Belief Endorsement if we suppose that the agent
takes some attitude or other towards the proposition that it's rational for him to believe P. If the agent is so
false. Once again, it follows from Belief Endorsement that she must believe that this
attitude is rational, in which case she'll think she's not in an epistemic dilemma. Finally,
suppose she suspends judgment on P. It follows from Endorsement that she must believe
that she should suspend judgment on P, which is, once again, incompatible with the belief
that she is in an epistemic dilemma. So, we see that no matter which doxastic attitude the
agent takes to P, Endorsement requires that the agent have a corresponding higher-order
belief that is incompatible with the belief that she is in an epistemic dilemma with respect
to P.54
So, I conclude that it would never be rational to believe that one is in an epistemic
dilemma, which further buttresses my claim that epistemic dilemmas are not possible.
8. Summary
To summarize, here is the structure of the argument picking up after Section 5:
(1) It is not rational to believe that skepticism is false. (defended in Sections 1 - 4)
(2) It is not rational to suspend judgment on skepticism. (defended in Section 6)
(3) Therefore, if there's any doxastic attitude one could rationally take towards
skepticism, it is disbelief.
(4) Epistemic dilemmas are not possible. (defended in Section 7)
(5) Therefore, there must be at least one doxastic attitude that one could rationally
take towards skepticism.
(6) Therefore, rationality requires that one disbelieve skepticism, i.e. believe that
skepticism is false.
9. Conclusion
I have argued, using only premises that even an external world skeptic would
accept, that rationality requires us to believe that external world skepticism is false. This
argument could be used to rationally persuade an external world skeptic to give up her
skepticism.
In contrast, many contemporary epistemologists regard the skeptic as a hopeless
case, and the attempt to reason with the skeptic as a lost cause. The skeptic is portrayed
as someone so far gone, epistemologically speaking, that there's no point in trying to save
conceptually impoverished that he cannot understand the proposition that his belief is rational, then Belief
Endorsement will not require him to believe it. However, if the agent is so conceptually impoverished that
he can't understand this proposition, then presumably he also couldn't understand the proposition that he is
in an epistemic dilemma. So it is true of this agent as well that he can't rationally believe that he is in an
epistemic dilemma, if only because he can't have this belief at all. In short, my claim is that it will be true
of all agents that either the agent is not capable of believing that he is in an epistemic dilemma, or that
Endorsement requires that he adopt a second-order belief that entails that he is not in an epistemic dilemma.
54 One might object that I have failed to consider the fourth possibility, namely, that the agent takes no
attitude at all towards P. If so, this is presumably because he is so conceptually impoverished that he
cannot understand the proposition P, in which case he would also be so conceptually impoverished that he
couldn't understand the proposition that he's in an epistemic dilemma with respect to P, and so could not
believe that he is in an epistemic dilemma with respect to P. Since he can't believe it, he can't rationally
believe it; so, my claim that no one could rationally believe that they are in an epistemic dilemma stands
fast.
her now. The best we can do is to try to prevent others, who are not yet skeptics, from
succumbing to the same fate. Thus Williamson's observation that most responses to
skepticism are "better at prevention than cure"5 5 and Byrne's remark that "the sceptic
doesn't need an argument; she needs [psychological] treatment."5 6
The upshot of this chapter is that this view of the situation is misguided. As I
have shown, we need not regard the skeptic as someone who can't be reasoned with.
Each premise of my argument should be accepted by an external world skeptic. Once the
skeptic has accepted the conclusion of my argument-that rationality requires us to
believe that skepticism is false-she should then adopt that belief. So, I claim,
philosophical argument alone is quite capable of reasoning the skeptic out of skepticism.
5 Williamson (2000, 27)
56 Byrne (2004, 301)
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